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INTRODUCTION

T

HERE is wide agreement in American law and scholarship about the
role the common law tradition plays in statutory interpretation. Jurists and scholars of various stripes concur that the common law points
away from formalist interpretive approaches like textualism and toward
a more creative, independent role for courts. They simply differ over
whether the common law tradition is worth preserving. Dynamic and
strongly purposive interpreters often claim the Anglo-American common law heritage supports their approach to statutory interpretation, and
that formalism is an unjustified break from that tradition. Many formalists reply that the common law mindset and methods are obsolete and
inimical to a modern legal system of separated powers. They argue that
because the legal center of gravity has shifted from courts to complex
statutory regimes, judicial interpreters, especially at the federal level,
should no longer understand themselves as bearers of the common law
tradition.
Thus, Judge Guido Calabresi’s case for judicial updating of outmoded
legislation presents itself as A Common Law for the Age of Statutes, 1
while Justice Scalia celebrates how interpretive formalism imposes discipline on Common-Law Courts in a Civil Law System. 2 This dichotomy
is not unique to the federal context. Judith Kaye, writing as Chief Judge
of the New York Court of Appeals, rejected a Scalia-style formalism
based on her court’s role as a “keeper[] of the common law.” 3 By con1

Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes (1982).
See Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law 3 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
3
Judith S. Kaye, Chief Judge, N.Y. Court of Appeals, State Courts at the Dawn of a New
Century: Common Law Courts Reading Statutes and Constitutions, The Justice William J.
Brennan, Jr. Lecture on State Courts & Social Justice (Mar. 31, 1995), in 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
1, 6 (1995).
2
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trast, Michigan Supreme Court Chief Justice Robert Young Jr., a textualist, rejects Chief Judge Kaye’s approach because statutory interpretation is “not a branch of common-law exegesis.” 4 If anything, rhetoric on
common law and statute is more dramatic at the state level, with Chief
Judge Kaye offering paeans to “the common law, that ‘golden and sacred rule of reason,’” 5 while Chief Justice Young likens the common
law to a “drunken, toothless ancient relative” who has overstayed his
welcome. 6
Contemporary debate in statutory interpretation offers a choice between either continuity with the common law tradition (and thus, creative statutory interpretation) or formalist interpretation that breaks with
that heritage. As with much conventional wisdom, this framework captures a good deal of truth. Nevertheless, those who accept this neat
frame, including myself in past work, 7 miss an important part of the picture. As this Article will argue, formal theories of interpretation like textualism, which today generally distance themselves from the common
law tradition, can claim support in that heritage. Furthermore, nonformal
approaches to statutory interpretation rely on a partial, controversial vision of the common law tradition. A more nuanced understanding of traditional common law thought undercuts an important justification for
nonformal theories of statutory interpretation—namely their continuity
with our common law legal tradition. More broadly, we need not understand the debate between formalists and their critics as a disagreement
about the common law tradition’s continued validity; rather, it concerns
which interpretation of that tradition best suits a modern, complex polity.
4
Robert P. Young, Jr., A Judicial Traditionalist Confronts Justice Brennan’s School of
Judicial Philosophy, Okla. City. U. School of Law William J. Brennan, Jr. Lecture on State
Constitutional Law & Government (Oct. 18, 2007), in 33 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 263, 280
(2008).
5
Kaye, supra note 3, at 5 (quoting Charles F. Mullett, Fundamental Law and the American
Revolution, 1760–1776, at 48 (1966)).
6
Robert P. Young, Jr., A Judicial Traditionalist Confronts the Common Law, 8 Tex. Rev.
L. & Pol. 299, 302 (2004).
7
See Kaye, supra note 3, at 6 (linking nonformalist interpretation to a state court’s role as
“keepers of the common law”); Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Statutes in Common Law Courts, 91
Tex. L. Rev. 479, 522–36 (2013) (exploring the effect state courts’ undisputed common law
powers have on interpretive method compared to federal courts of limited jurisdiction); Peter
L. Strauss, The Common Law and Statutes, 70 U. Colo. L. Rev. 225, 225 (1999) [hereinafter
Strauss, The Common Law] (arguing that “our fundamental commitment to the common
law . . . is inconsistent with” textualist statutory interpretation).
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To establish these points, this Article takes up central ideas that classical common lawyers held about legislation, interpretation, and the legal system to show how these notions recommend formal, faithful agency in statutory interpretation. 8 The central relevant feature of classical
common law thought is its participants’ understanding of their practice
as the disciplined refinement and embodiment of a polity’s customs and
beliefs. Law, in a common law system, rose up from the practices and
beliefs of the people, rather than descending in systematic form from the
will of a ruling cadre. This understanding unified the common law justification for law developed in adjudication and legislation alike. 9 In fact,
the common law method of adjudication—with its reactive and incremental development of law through structured argument—anticipates
the formal, rule-laden, and nonsystematic manner in which American
legislatures today translate popular norms and preferences into statutes. 10 Common law adjudication and common law legislation pursue
similar ends in analogous fashion.
Advocates of nonformal statutory interpretation take this congruence
as a cue for courts to depart from faithful agency in the development of
statutory regimes. 11 This standard, antiformalist move is a misapplication, or at least a controversial reading, of the common law tradition itself. Common law legislation by its nature is often a product of untidy
compromises necessary to secure supermajority support, and is rooted in

8

The aim here is not to establish that sixteenth- and seventeenth-century common lawyers
were unwavering textualists or original intentionalists in statutory interpretation. That was
not likely the case. See Gerald J. Postema, Classical Common Law Jurisprudence (Part II), 3
Oxford U. Commonwealth L.J. 1, 17–21 (2003) [hereinafter Postema II] (describing Hale’s
approach to statutory interpretation in relatively nonformal terms). But see generally Jim Evans, A Brief History of Equitable Interpretation in the Common Law System, in Legal Interpretation in Democratic States 67, 67, 85 (Jeffrey Goldsworthy & Tom Campbell eds., 2002)
(challenging broad claims about common lawyers’ departures from faithful agency in statutory interpretation). Nor does this analysis rest on the already established point that many
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century common law jurists took formal approaches to statutory
interpretation. See Hans W. Baade, The Casus Omissus: A Pre-History of Statutory Analogy,
20 Syracuse J. Int’l L. & Com. 45, 93 (1994) (“[T]he ‘equity of the statute’ fell victim to the
sovereignty of Parliament.”); John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute,
101 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 53–54 (2001) (“The shift away from equitable interpretation had become perceptible during the eighteenth century. By the nineteenth century, the trend was
unmistakable.”).
9
See infra Part II.
10
See infra Part III.
11
See William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the “Judicial
Power” in Statutory Interpretation, 1776–1806, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 990, 998–1009 (2001).
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reasoning that is difficult for outsiders to reconstruct after the fact. If
legislation is a modern iteration of common law lawmaking, dynamic
interpreters who seek to update or smooth the rough corners of statutes
resemble classical common lawyers’ archrivals: philosophers and royalists who sought to rationalize the untidy warrens of common law doctrine. Like those academic lawyers who sought to privilege their isolated
reasoning over the shared wisdom of the common law, a dynamic interpreter puts herself in the position not only of a legislator, but a legislature, whose translation of public views and practices into concrete norms
she as an individual cannot replicate. By contrast, classical common law
lawyers contended their lay competitors’ natural reason was inferior to
the disciplined, shared “artificial reason” of the common law in identifying and integrating the common customs of the people. Interpretive formalists respect the artificial reason of common law legislation when refusing to upset awkward legislative compromises or update statutes to
comply with contemporary values. 12
In this light, the central disagreement between formalists and their
opponents is an argument within the common law tradition about the
deference courts owe to the legislature, an institution that also identifies
and translates social norms into common—shared—law. An interpretive
formalist can see the legislature as the culmination of the common law
tradition, not its nemesis. Accordingly, while such formalists need not
reject judicial development of common law in the absence of legislative
direction, they defer to reasonably clear statutory norms out of respect
for the legislature’s superior and inimitable process of forging shared
norms. To be clear, the formalist argument is a development of the classical common law tradition, not a secret history. Nevertheless, the mindset of the interpretive formalist coheres with central ideas in classical
common law theory and can be seen as the natural development of a tradition that has increasingly linked law with popular custom and consent.
In fact, given the challenges a complex, pluralistic society poses to developing common law through adjudication, the formalist’s emphasis on
legislative primacy may be necessary for the tradition to survive. 13
One final note on scope: This work leaves for another day the role of
administrative agencies in statutory interpretation and the common law
tradition. To some, agencies are today’s true practitioners of the com12
13

See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
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mon law. 14 To others, they represent an anathematic return to the Star
Chamber. 15 Unpacking this analysis’s implications for the fourth branch
of government is neither obvious nor trivial and deserves a separate
work.
The Article will proceed as follows. Part I will catalog the received
wisdom that our common law heritage presses against formal approaches and in favor of more dynamic methods. Part II will offer a fresh look
at the relationship between the common law and legislation, arguing that
important figures in the common law tradition championed parliamentary legislation and understood it as an important source of common law.
The common law, in fact, plays a central role in a broader conception of
law that views law as ascending from the people, rather than descending
from a select few. Legislation by assembly, like common law adjudication, aspires to identify and channel popular custom into formal law.
Part III will explicate a theory of legislation as a form of common
law. It picks out key features of classical common law theory—the “artificial reason of the law” and its development—and explains how they
are manifest not only in adjudication, but also in the style of legislation
by American assemblies. Part IV will unpack the interpretive implications of legislation in common law style. In particular, it identifies important breaks between today’s dynamic statutory interpreters and the
common law tradition, while also highlighting unappreciated affinities
between that heritage and more formal approaches to legislation. Part V
will step back to underline mutually reinforcing features of the common
law tradition and statutory formalism. From this broader perspective, the
statutory formalism’s deference appears a faithful development of the
common law tradition and an advance on the more juriscentric versions
championed by dynamic interpreters.
I. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION THEORY AND THE COMMON LAW TODAY
Statutory interpretation theory does not lack labels for methodological
schools. For simplicity’s sake, this Article groups these various ap14
See Cass R. Sunstein, Is Tobacco a Drug? Administrative Agencies as Common Law
Courts, 47 Duke L.J. 1013, 1019–20 (1998) (“[A]gencies have become modern America’s
common law courts, and properly so.”).
15
See Philip Hamburger, Is Administrative Law Unlawful? 28–29 (2014) (“American administrative law revives the extralegal government familiar from the royal prerogative. . . . it
restores a version of the absolute prerogative . . . that purported to bind and that flourished
before the development of constitutional law.”).
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proaches under two headings: formalist and nonformalist approaches. As
used here, formalist approaches to interpretation are those more committed to treat the “objective” meaning enacted statutory language (roughly,
the reasonable reader’s meaning) or original legislative intent (roughly,
speakers’ meaning) as precluding further independent judgment by the
interpreter. 16
Nonformalism or antiformalism, for lack of better organizing headings, 17 while giving weight to original meaning or intention, affords the
interpreter greater authority to broaden, narrow, or, in some cases, reject
the most plausible available understanding of that original meaning or
intention. An interpreter like Judge Richard Posner may do this to fulfill
what he hypothesizes as the original purpose or what the enacting legislature would have wanted in a given case. 18 Alternatively, dynamic theorists like Professor William Eskridge or Judge Guido Calabresi would
give courts discretion to update or deem obsolescent statutes that conflict with contemporary public values. 19
Many statutory formalists see legislative primacy at odds with the
common law tradition. Nonformalists, by contrast, seek to adapt that
tradition to our age of statutes. This Part elaborates these standard takes
on the relationship between common law and statutory interpretation.

16

See Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 Yale L.J. 509, 511–20 (1988) (distinguishing this
understanding of formalism from the version associated with late nineteenth-century common lawyers like Christopher Columbus Langdell). This does not mean formalists never apply standards or creatively develop the law. When legislation is unclear, prescribes a standard, or otherwise confers decision making authority to the interpreter, a formalist will
exercise that judgment within the confines of other clear rules.
17
See David A. Strauss, The Anti-Formalist, 74 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1885, 1886, 1890–94
(2007) (characterizing the approach of Judge Richard Posner). Formalism is often contrasted
with “functionalism,” but the label’s affiliation with social science and instrumentalism does
not chime with some nonformalist approaches. For example, Ronald Dworkin is no formalist, but his celebration of high principle and broad moral vision is hardly functionalist.
18
See United States v. Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312, 1333–37 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (Posner, J., dissenting).
19
Calabresi, supra note 1, at 82–83, 146–49; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory
Interpretation, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1479, 1554–55 (1987) (arguing that “federal courts should
interpret statutes in light of their current as well as historical context” and that “[d]ynamic
interpretation is most appropriate when the statute is old yet still the source of litigation, is
generally phrased, and faces significantly changed societal problems or legal contexts”).
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A. Nonformalism and the Common Law Tradition
Continuity with the common law tradition is a touchstone for nonformalist statutory interpretation. Drawing on law’s conservative, preservationist character, and the appeal of systemic coherence, many nonformalists invoke the common law tradition to defend their approach while
casting formalist rivals as suspicious, radical interlopers.
1. The Courts
Federal and state courts often draw connections between the common
law tradition and nonformal statutory interpretation. A foundational nonformalist opinion in federal law, Holy Trinity Church v. United States,
justifies the Court’s preference for legislation’s spirit over its letter by
relying upon William Coke and common law cases reported by the sixteenth-century English lawyer Edmund Plowden. 20 Holy Trinity Church
is also the centerpiece of the majority opinion in United Steelworkers of
America v. Weber, a touchstone for modern dynamic theorists. 21 The
Supreme Court’s admiralty decision in Moragne v. States Marine Lines,
which arguably extended the reach of a statute by analogy, 22 echoes
Chief Justice Stone’s invocation of “the duty of the common-law court
to . . . interweave the new legislative policies with the inherited body of
common-law principles.” 23 Supreme Court dissents from formalist opinions also invoke the common law. 24

20

143 U.S. 457, 459–61 (1892).
443 U.S. 193, 201 (1979); Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle 316–31 (1985);
Eskridge, supra note 19, at 1488–94 (discussing Weber); see also id. at 1492 (identifying
Justice Blackmun’s concurring opinion in Weber as more persuasive an example of dynamic
interpretation than the majority opinion); Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big
Heat: The Revival of Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 77 Minn. L. Rev. 241, 247 (1992)
(arguing that “[t]o defend Weber, then, one needed a theory of statutory interpretation” more
elaborate than mere invocation of spirit).
22
See Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Private Law in the Gaps, 82 Fordham L. Rev. 1689, 1719–
20 (2014).
23
398 U.S. 375, 392 (1970); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 26, 29 n.6 (1994) (“Stable equilibrium is the
common law ideal, best exemplified at the Supreme Court level in admiralty cases” like
Moragne.).
24
See, e.g., Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 563 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (approving of a method that would “evolve[] not through a ‘rules first’ approach,
but in the traditional, fact-bound, case-by-case common-law way”); Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, 458 U.S. 564, 578 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Holy Trinity Church,
143 U.S. at 459).
21
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The relationship is even more pronounced for state courts unburdened
by the post-Erie notion that federal courts lack general common law
“powers.” Chief Judge Kaye argued that state law is a complex tapestry
of common law and statute, making the court an interlocutor with the
legislature, not just a passive interpreter of statutory commands. 25 This
“common-law method compels courts” to depart from a statute’s plain
meaning at times. 26 State court decisions rejecting the U.S. Supreme
Court’s formalist, restrictive approach to implied private rights of action
highlight their common law powers to supplement statutory remedies. 27
2. Ronald Dworkin’s Common Law Romanticism
Legal theorists have elaborated the courts’ intuitive link between the
common law tradition and nonformal statutory interpretation. Perhaps
most prominent is the work of legal philosopher Professor Ronald
Dworkin, whose ideal judge “will use much the same techniques of interpretation to read statutes that he uses to decide common-law cases.” 28
And, given Dworkin’s reputation as “a common law romantic” 29 there is
little doubt that his common law theory is in the driver’s seat. In statutory interpretation, as with common law adjudication, the ideal judge
seeks “to find the best justification he can” that fits with the legal materials at hand. 30 Legislative text, like common law precedents, presents
the judge the task of constructing “some justification that fits and flows
through the statute and is, if possible, consistent with other legislation in
force.” 31 His method is hostile to “checkerboard laws” that do not em-

25

See Kaye, supra note 1, at 5–11.
Id. at 26. Similarly, the Supreme Court of Connecticut’s rejection of the plain meaning
rule traced its purposive approach’s roots to the common law classic Heydon’s Case. State v.
Courchesne, 816 A.2d 562, 581, 585 (Conn. 2003).
27
See, e.g., Nat’l Trust for Historic Pres. v. City of Albuquerque, 874 P.2d 798, 801 (N.M.
App. 1994); San Lorenzo Educ. Ass’n. v. Wilson, 654 P.2d 202, 204 n.5 (Cal. 1982); see
also Gandy v. Wal-Mart Stores, 872 P.2d 859, 862–63 (N.M. 1994) (using “public policy”
manifested in a discrimination statute to give rise to an additional common law tort action
for retaliatory discharge).
28
Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire 313 (1986).
29
David Dyzenhaus & Michael Taggart, Reasoned Decisions and Legal Theory, in Common Law Theory 134, 134 (Douglas E. Edlin ed., 2007).
30
Dworkin, supra note 28, at 338; see also id. at 313 (“He will ask himself which reading
of the act . . . shows the political history including and surrounding that statute in the better
light.”).
31
Id. at 338.
26
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body principled consistency. 32 Rather than viewing legislation as “negotiated compromises that carry no more or deeper meaning than the text,”
we are to treat “legislation as flowing from the community’s present
commitment to a background scheme of political morality.” 33 Like the
common law judge, an interpreter of legislation “must justify the story
as a whole, not just its ending.” 34
This framework leads Dworkin to a nonformalist stance. He rejects
the concept of “original intent” as a lodestar for interpretation 35 as well
as the textualist’s distinction between semantically clear statutes that
demand adherence and ambiguous provisions that require creative
judgment. 36 Dworkin’s ideal judge sometimes also “must take” legislative history into account when “deciding which story of the legislative
event is overall the best story.” 37 Dworkin centers his jurisprudential argument on a defense of Riggs v. Palmer, a case invoking background
common law principles to contravene what a formalist dissent saw as
reasonably clear statutory rules on voiding wills. 38 Similarly, his discussion of statutory interpretation is an extended critique of Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, which held that the plain meaning of the Endan-

32

Id. at 178–84.
Id. at 345–46.
34
Id. at 338; see George C. Christie, Dworkin’s “Empire,” 36 Duke L.J. 157, 177 (1987)
(reviewing Dworkin, supra note 28) (“In short, Hercules aims to make the legislative story,
as a whole, as good as it can be.”). Dworkin does distinguish between legislation and common law adjudication. For him, adjudication is primarily concerned with questions of principle and individual rights, whereas the legislature can make “policy” decisions that roughly
promote general or particular interests. See Dworkin, supra note 28, at 221–24, 410. An ideal
judge will proceed differently “when a statute rather than a set of law reports has been placed
before him,” but only because a judge interpreting legislation can factor in not just legal
principles, but also policy. Id. at 337.
35
See Dworkin, supra note 28 at 317–27; cf. Richard Ekins, Legislative Intent in Law’s
Empire, 24 Ratio Juris 435, 444–50 (2011) (defending a concept of original intent immune
from Dworkin’s criticism).
36
See Dworkin, supra note 28, at 350–54; cf. John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists
from Purposivists?, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 70, 91–109 (2006) (identifying adherence to clear
semantic meaning over background policy context as textualism’s central differentiating tenet).
37
Dworkin, supra note 28, at 346.
38
22 N.E. 188, 189–90 (N.Y. 1889); see Dworkin, supra note 28, at 15–20 (discussing
Riggs).
33
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gered Species Act required the protection of the snail darter “in spite
of,” in Dworkin’s words, “great waste of public funds.” 39
3. Dynamic Legal Realists
Dworkin rejects the legal realist thesis that judges legislate in the context of adjudication, even in so-called hard cases. 40 Other nonformalists
understand the common law as a form of judge-made law. Working
within this legal realist understanding, they argue that the common law
tradition recommends a dynamic approach to interpretation that gives
courts authority to make law that may contravene original intent or
meaning.
In A Common Law for the Age of Statutes, Judge Calabresi proposes
that courts, under limited circumstances, be granted “authority to determine whether a statute is obsolete,” and treated as if it “were no more
and no less than part of the common law.” 41 Courts could “alter a written
law or some part of it in the same way (and with the same reluctance) in
which they can modify or abandon a common law doctrine or even a
whole complex set of interrelated doctrines.” 42 This common law task is
one courts can accomplish “using traditional judicial methods and
modes of reasoning.” 43 Such courts will be engaging in the traditional
function of managing the law’s “continuity and change by applying the
great vague principle of treating like cases alike.” 44 If, like with common
law doctrines, a statute “comes not to fit, or to fit awkwardly” in the
broader fabric of the law, “courts are able to say so and are as justified in
inducing a reconsideration of the statute as they are in reworking the
common law.” 45 Because updating courts use the “judicial skills” of
“looking for consistencies and analogies, the task for which [a court] is
39

437 U.S. 153, 172–88 (1978); Dworkin, supra note 28, at 21; see id. at 337–54 (explicating his method of statutory interpretation through the lens of Tennessee Valley Authority v.
Hill).
40
See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1057, 1058 (1975) (“[J]udges
neither should be nor are deputy legislators, and the familiar assumption, that when they go
beyond political decisions already made by someone else they are legislating, is misleading.”).
41
Calabresi, supra note 1, at 2. Judge Calabresi does not seek to revive a lost Golden Age
of juriscentric common lawyering at the expense of legislation. Id. at 163 (rejecting “a nostalgic restoration of courts as the primary makers of law, in our system”).
42
Id. at 82.
43
Id. at 164.
44
Id. at 165.
45
Id. at 108.
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trained,” the legitimacy of such revision “remains the same as at common law.” 46
Professor Peter Strauss draws on the common law to defend dynamic
interpretation and to indict more formalist methods. In our common law
tradition, unlike civil law systems, “[c]ourts ‘make law’ as a consequence of the operation of a system of precedent,” including when they
interpret statutes. 47 Similarly, our legislatures make law in a common
law style, “creating statutes to achieve marginal changes” in reaction to
particular problems, rather than enacting comprehensive codes in continental fashion. 48 Thus, “a common law system [of] any realistic description” identifies legislatures and courts as “partners in the work of government” even if the courts are the junior partner. 49 In common law
fashion, the “legislature and court operate in parallel, working marginal
change in response to social pressure.” 50 It is fair for the legislature to
assume that courts will take up its handiwork and pursue “the ideal of a
unified system of judge-made and statute law woven into a seamless
whole by the processes of adjudication.” 51
On these grounds, “once we have admitted the common law into that
field,” 52 the textualist bête noirs of legislative history and unenacted
purpose are essential. To privilege enacted text over background purpose
is to invite “interbranch war.” 53 Professor Strauss thus laments the Supreme Court’s formalist “resegregation” of the worlds of common law
and statute. 54 “Accretive change and integration of law, so characteristic
of common law courts, seem no longer to be federal judges’ responsibilities in dealing with statutes.” 55 A true common law system, however,
permits extension of statutes by analogy and dynamic interpretation in
light of broader change in social circumstances and the legal system. 56
46

Id.
Strauss, The Common Law, supra note 7, at 253.
Id. at 225.
49
Id. at 252; see also id. at 254 (“The legislature is the primary law-maker, and the judiciary a secondary law-maker.”).
50
Id. at 243.
51
Id. at 238 (quoting Harlan Fiske Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 Harv.
L. Rev. 4, 12 (1936)).
52
Id. at 253.
53
Id. at 246.
54
Peter L. Strauss, On Resegregating the Worlds of Statute and Common Law, 1994 Sup.
Ct. Rev. 429, 527–28 [hereinafter Strauss, Resegregating].
55
Id. at 434.
56
See id. at 436–37.
47
48
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Professor Eskridge also uses the common law as a shield to defend his
approach and as a sword against formalist theories. Per Eskridge, courts
interpret common law “‘dynamically,’ that is, in light of their present
societal, political, and legal context,” rather than merely through their
text and historical context. 57 This approach to common law challenges
the notion that statutes are “static texts,” whose meaning and purpose are
fixed at the moment of enactment. 58 In defense of his dynamic approach,
he appeals to the “common law-making powers” that Article III, Section
2’s grant of “judicial Power” vests in federal courts. 59 He invokes William Blackstone and the common law classic Heydon’s Case 60 to establish that the original understanding of the judicial power contemplates
courts’ authority to depart from textual meaning in favor of “the statute’s overall purposes and the current demands of equity.” 61
Eskridge argues that “modern formalism” is a break from the AngloAmerican legal tradition, a suspect interpolation of “late nineteenth century assumptions” and dogma that effaces the cooperative role of the judiciary central to our common law heritage as understood by “[e]ducated
lawyers” at the Founding. 62 Statutory formalism, a Victorian-era artifact
that understands law as a matter of “will and choice,” rather than developing reason, was alien to the Framers and “has little persuasive power
for our society today.” 63 Disposing of this anomalous, jurisprudential intermeddler will bring coherence across the fields of common law, statutory, and constitutional interpretation while connecting American contemporary legal practice with its historical roots. 64

57

Eskridge, supra note 19, at 1479.
Id. at 1479–80; see also id. at 1481 (“[S]tatutes, like the Constitution and the common
law, should be interpreted dynamically.”).
59
Id. at 1499–1500; see also Eskridge, supra note 11, at 992 (“One of my challenges has
been for the new textualists to justify their methodology by reference to the original understanding of Article III’s ‘judicial Power,’ which strikes me as friendlier to a pragmatic rather
than strictly textualist methodology.”).
60
Eskridge, supra note 19, at 1502 & n.91 (citing Heydon’s Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 637, 638
(Ex. Ch. 1584)).
61
Id. at 1502.
62
Id.
63
Id. at 1503.
64
Eskridge seems to straddle the line between common law romanticism and realism. By
relying on Blackstone and Heydon’s Case, and by casting formalism as a positivist interruption of the common law tradition, he channels the pre-legal realist tradition. By characterizing Article III as a grant of lawmaking power, however, he buys into the post-legal realist
conception of common law adjudication as form of judicial legislation.
58
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4. Strong Purposivism
Finally, the common law exerts a pull on the purposivism of the legal
process school. 65 Legal process theorists Professors Hart and Sacks
thought courts should adopt an interpretation that best promotes the purpose of the statute and the legal system as a whole, so long as the text
would “bear” that reading. 66 The purpose the court should impute to the
legislature is not an actual, historical intent or purpose, but should flow
from the assumption that legislation is an act of “reasonable persons
pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably.” 67 Their central example of
this technique for inferring purpose is, again, Heydon’s Case, which attends not to the text or historical intention, but rather the “mischief” in
the old law and the “true reason for the remedy.” 68
Judge Calabresi sees Hart and Sacks’s method as a predecessor to his
own. Like him, they subordinate actual, historical legislative will in favor of “maintaining the fabric of the law” and recognize that interpreters, like common law courts, “make law,” thus breaking down “simplistic views of automatic, hard and fast barriers between written law and
judicial roles.” 69 In Hart and Sacks’s pursuit of broader, reasonable coherence in the law we also see the early glimmers of Ronald Dworkin’s
common law romanticism. Their writing on legislation “seeks to show
that statutes should reflect, as much as possible, the sort of principles
found in common law.” 70 For that reason, the legal process approach is
“not primarily a theory of statutory interpretation, since it is as much (if
not more) a theory of common law interpretation.” 71 And for Hart and
Sacks, the common law can offer “a comprehensive, underlying body of
law adequate for the resolution of all the disputes that may arise within
the social order.” 72
65

See Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the
Making and Application of Law 1374–80 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds.,
1994).
66
Id. at 1374.
67
Id. at 1378.
68
Id.
69
Calabresi, supra note 1, at 87–88.
70
Anthony J. Sebok, Reading The Legal Process, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 1571, 1592 (1996); see
also Neil Duxbury, Patterns of American Jurisprudence 258 (1995) (“Hart and Sacks purport
to favour neither common law nor legislation, . . . yet they seem to display a peculiar preference for the judicial decision.”).
71
Sebok, supra note 70, at 1594.
72
Hart & Sacks, supra note 65, at 647. Their distinction between comprehensive codes and
isolated enactments is also telling. Isolated enactments may allow courts to resolve a dispute
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B. Statutory Formalism Against the Common Law Tradition
At their most ambitious, nonformalists urge a court “openly to commit itself to a common law model of statutory interpretation,” in which
statutes are “statements of consensually agreed-upon principles—
modern analogues to common law rules of decision.” 73 Otherwise,
courts abandon the common law tradition and become “mere servitors of
a positivistic sovereign.” 74 They view formalism as resting on Victorian,
“late nineteenth century assumptions” 75 that “resegregate[]” 76 the world
of common law and statute (with common law having a separate and unequal status). Unmoved by such laments, modern formalists celebrate
their break with the common law’s outdated, unjustified preference for
the judicial prerogative. 77 They would rather have judges work as mere
servitors of justified legislative authority than reign as prideful princes in
law’s empire. 78
1. Textualists
A prime example of statutory formalism in American law is textualism, which prioritizes a reasonably clear, public semantic meaning of

“without any reference to the statute whatever” or “encourage[] or direct[] judicial change in
accordance with the underlying policy or principle of the statute.” Id. at 1377–78. A comprehensive code may imply that the legislature is “the sole agency of growth of the law” after enactment. Id. at 1378. This contrast points to a division between a restrained civil law
regime and a common law system permitting reasoned elaboration.
73
Note, Intent, Clear Statements, and the Common Law: Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 892, 913 (1982). The author of this unsigned note is the nowprominent law professor Richard Pildes. See Richard H. Pildes, CV, at 6, http://its.law.nyu.edu/
faculty/profiles/CVFiles/vitawithoutlectures.pdf.
74
Note, supra note 73, at 898.
75
Eskridge, supra note 19, at 1502.
76
Strauss, Resegregating, supra note 54, at 528.
77
A notable exception is Professor Caleb Nelson, whose inclination toward formalism
does not lead to hostility toward common law. See generally Caleb Nelson, The Legitimacy
of (Some) Federal Common Law, 101 Va. L. Rev. 1 (2015) [hereinafter Nelson, Legitimacy]; Caleb Nelson, The Persistence of General Law, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 503 (2006) [hereinafter Nelson, Persistence] (explaining the continued relevance of unwritten law in the federal
system); Caleb Nelson, State and Federal Models of the Interaction Between Statutes and
Unwritten Law, 80 U. Chi. L. Rev. 657 (2013) [hereinafter Nelson, State and Federal Models].
78
Compare Dworkin, supra note 28, at 407 (“The courts are the capitals of law’s empire,
and judges are its princes . . . .”) with John Milton, Paradise Lost, bk. I (Scott Ellege ed.,
Norton Critical ed. 1993) (1667) (“Better to reign in hell, than serve in heav’n”).
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enacted text over unenacted purpose and background policy context. 79
The textualist Justice Antonin Scalia names his most famous methodological essay Common-Law Courts in a Civil Law System: The Role of
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and
Laws. 80 There, he contrasts the role of a federal judge with that of “playing common-law judge,” namely “playing king—devising, out of the
brilliance of one’s own mind, those laws that ought to govern mankind.” 81 The primary task of a federal judge—operating in what Justice
Scalia sees as a civil law system of limited discretion—is to resolve legal
questions by “interpretation of text,” not exposition of common law
rules and principles. 82 And “interpretation” here refers to identifying and
adhering to an objective understanding of the text’s meaning at the time
of enactment. 83 Similarly, in the context of private rights of action, Justice Scalia explains that “[r]aising up causes of action where a statute
has not created them may be a proper function for common-law courts,
but not for federal tribunals.” 84
The textualist Judge Frank Easterbrook works on similar assumptions. 85 He argues that courts interpreting statutes should adhere to “cases anticipated by its framers and expressly resolved in the legislative
process.” 86 Judicial creation of rules in common law fashion in the teeth
of text is grounded on the “simply fallacious” premise “that courts can

79

See John F. Manning, Second-Generation Textualism, 98 Calif. L. Rev. 1287, 1288
(2010); see also Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function of
Plain Meaning, 1990 Sup. Ct. Rev. 231, 232 (noting the rise of such formalism in the Supreme Court and offering “a plausible normative argument supporting” this development).
80
Scalia, supra note 2.
81
Id. at 7.
82
Id. at 13.
83
See, e.g., Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t. of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 122 (2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that courts should interpret “the law as Congress has written it, not
as we would wish it to be”); see also id. (“The only sure indication of what Congress intended is what Congress enacted; and even if there is a difference between the two, the rule of
law demands that the latter prevail.”).
84
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 287 (2001) (quoting Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind,
Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 365 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment)).
85
See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction,
11 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y, 59, 65 (1988) (“We should look at the statutory structure and
hear the words as they would sound in the mind of a skilled, objectively reasonable user of
words.”).
86
Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 533, 544 (1983).
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establish a principled jurisprudence” on their own. 87 Furthermore, such
freestanding judicial power contradicts Judge Easterbrook’s view that
“there is no free-floating common law” in the federal system. 88 Federal
courts may depart from the civil law model and craft new rules through
precedent only when a statute like the Sherman Act “plainly hands
courts the power to create and revise a form of common law.” 89 Otherwise they must apply the objectively reasonable textual meaning or, if
the legislation does not clearly speak to the dispute, “put the statute
down.” 90
State-court textualists sound a similar theme. Michigan Supreme
Court Justice Robert Young Jr., for example, argues that statutory interpretation is “not a branch of common-law exegesis” because the separation of powers requires the court to respect the legislature’s codified
text. 91 In construing this text, unlike when expounding common law,
courts have no authority to correct what they see as poor, but otherwise
constitutional, legislative policy choices. 92 This is a happy result for Justice Young, who likens the common law to a drunken, elderly relative
overstaying his welcome at a party—better ignored than welcomed into
the discussion. 93 Other commentary on state jurisprudence, while less
disdainful of the common law, justifies formalist approaches to legislation by distinguishing between the common law process and statutory
interpretation. 94
Academic textualists follow suit. Textualist John Manning, for example, argues that classical English cases adopting nonformal methods of
interpretation should not inform federal practice because those common
law courts blended lawmaking and adjudicative powers in a manner al-

87

Id. at 534 n.2 (citing Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 Harv. L.
Rev. 802, 811–32 (1982)).
88
Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 123 F.3d 490, 553 (7th Cir. 1997) (Easterbrook, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
89
Easterbrook, supra note 86, at 544.
90
Easterbrook, supra note 85, at 65.
91
Young, supra note 4, at 280; see also O’Neal v. St. John Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 791
N.W.2d 853, 879–80 (Mich. 2010) (Young, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for “perform[ing] a spectacularly hubristic feat in treating a statutory medical malpractice claim as
though it were a mere matter of common law and thus subject to its revisionary powers”).
92
See Young, supra note 4, at 281.
93
Young, supra note 6, at 302.
94
See Ron Beal, The Art of Statutory Construction: Texas Style, 64 Baylor L. Rev. 339,
342–48 (2012).
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ien to our constitutional norms and structure. 95 Similarly, while not staking a firm position on state law, his defense of federal textualism contrasts state courts’ general common law powers with the limited jurisdiction of post-Erie federal courts. 96 These distinctions are central to
Manning’s rebuttal of William Eskridge’s argument that Article III’s
“judicial Power” authorizes nonformal, equitable statutory interpretation. 97
2. Formal Intentionalists and Faithful Agency Theorists
Statutory formalism is not limited to textualists who preclude any
strong role for legislative intent in interpretation. 98 For example, although intentionalism is usually associated with immersion in legislative
history, a number of intentionalists advocate formalist interpretive
methods—prioritizing text as evidence of intent, rejecting the use of legislative history, and resisting calls to interpret statutes in light of “purpose” understood at a high level of generality. 99 A prime example is Professor Richard Ekins, whose rule-like rejection of legislative history and
strong emphasis on publicly enacted text often resembles textualism in
practice. 100

95

See Manning, supra note 8, at 29–36.
See John F. Manning, Response, Deriving Rules of Statutory Interpretation from the
Constitution, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1648, 1662–63 (2001).
97
See notes 57–61 and accompanying text.
98
The greatest role that orthodox textualists will give to legislative intent is the minimal
intention that a speaker wishes to be understood pursuant to the community’s objective, conventional norms of speech in the given context. See John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 2387, 2457–58 & n.258 (2003) (citing Joseph Raz, Intention in Interpretation, in The Autonomy of Law: Essays on Legal Positivism 249, 257–60 (Robert P.
George ed., 1996)).
99
See, e.g., Richard Ekins, The Nature of Legislative Intent 254, 272 (2012); cf. Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, “Is That English You’re Speaking?” Why Intention Free Interpretation Is an Impossibility, 41 San Diego L. Rev. 967, 992 (2004) (arguing that textualism is best understood as a rule-like method for identifying legislative intent); Caleb Nelson,
What is Textualism?, 91 Va. L. Rev. 347, 349 (2005) (same).
100
See Ekins, supra note 99, at 268–72; see also Donald L. Drakeman, Charting a New
Course in Statutory Interpretation: A Commentary on Richard Ekins’ The Nature of Legislative Intent, 24 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 107, 117 n.90, 120 (2014) (noting some practical
similarities despite sharp theoretical differences between Ekins and textualists like John
Manning); Hillel Y. Levin, Intentionalism Justice Scalia Could Love, 30 Const. Comment.
89, 96–99 (2015) (reviewing Richard Ekins, The Nature of Legislative Intent (2012)) (noting
the practical similarities between Ekins’s intentionalism and Justice Scalia’s textualism).
96
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Such intentionalists contrast legislation and its interpretation with the
common law method. Ekins argues that enacted legislation, or “a detailed set of legal rules—a code,” tends to “posit[] law in the best form
possible.” 101 This is because its “public, canonical text, which is the focus of legal reasoning,” can settle public questions more clearly and decisively than alternative candidates like custom or “the best understanding of a line of cases.” 102 Similarly, he argues that a legislature is particparticularly well suited for deliberating about the common good. 103 If
courts treat legislative language like case holdings—collapsing canonical decisions into higher-level purposes or inchoate principles—they undermine the common good and the rule of law. 104
Professor Thomas Merrill puts faithful agency to legislation and respect for statutory meaning atop his hierarchy of tasks in statutory interpretation. 105 Only when those tools run out should courts use “integrative” tools like precedent, canons, and coherence with other
enactments. 106 Merrill explains that the originalist, faithful-agent mode
of interpretation flows from the nineteenth-century positivist notion that
subjects, including judges, must obey the commands of the sovereign. 107
By contrast, Merrill argues that the less formal, “integrative” mode,
which seeks to “knit [multiple] sources together in order to produce the
meaning that has the best ‘fit,’” has historical roots in common law
judging. 108 The “positivist,” legislature-directed mode of interpretation

101

Ekins, supra note 99, at 125.
Id.; see also Paul Yowell, Legislation, Common Law, and the Virtue of Clarity, in
Modern Challenges to the Rule of Law (Richard Ekins ed., 2011) (identifying ways in which
the clarity of legislative direction promotes rule-of-law values better than does the common
law).
103
See Ekins, supra note 99, at 125 (“The legislature responds directly to the complexity
of the common good in that its deliberation is open to whatever is relevant . . . including
moral argument, empirical findings, and the interests of various members of the community . . . .”).
104
See, e.g., id. at 253 (arguing that courts should respect the means a legislature has chosen to pursue a particular end, “even if it may be unwise”); cf. John F. Manning, Federalism
and the Generality Problem in Constitutional Interpretation, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 2003, 2007
(2009) (“[B]ecause legislators choose means as well as ends, an interpreter must respect not
only the goals of legislation, but also the specific choices Congress has made about how
those goals are to be achieved.”).
105
Thomas W. Merrill, Faithful Agent, Integrative, and Welfarist Interpretation, 14 Lewis
& Clark L. Rev. 1565, 1575, 1590–91 (2010).
106
Id. at 1582–83.
107
See id. at 1567, 1569.
108
Id. at 1569.
102
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must have primacy to respect “the bedrock principle of our constitutional government—popular sovereignty.” 109 Accordingly, he criticizes
“nonoriginalist” interpretations for departing too far from faithful agency, and he finds “pragmatic,” openly consequentialist approaches “corrosive” to the legal system. 110
II. THE PLACE OF LEGISLATION IN THE COMMON LAW TRADITION
This Article challenges the received wisdom on the relationship between the common law and statutory interpretation. Doing so requires
demonstrating that the common law tradition does not subordinate reasonably clear statutory norms to judicial creativity. The first step is to
show how common law theory is less hostile to legislation than many
contemporary formalists believe. As this Part will show, sophisticated
classical common lawyers saw legislation as a central component in a
common law system that sought to internalize the general customs and
ways of the realm. Rules arising in adjudication and legislative statutes
were two forms of law pursuing the same goal of embodying the custom
of the realm. As Part III will show, the process for enacting statutes in
common law systems resembles the formulation of rules in adjudication
in significant respects. Common law, in short, is not just about the heroic judge. In fact, it is no exaggeration to say that the populism of classical common law theory laid the groundwork for parliamentary supremacy.
Accordingly, a sharp separation between common law rules and legislation is not sustainable, nor is the belief that the common law tradition
champions judicial decisions to the detriment of legislation. So far, antiformalists who claim the common law tradition would agree. But it is
also far from clear that understanding statutory legislation as a kind of
“common law” entails a rejection of formalism in statutory interpretation. While this Part and Part III will undermine the standard formalist
view of the common law tradition, Part IV will challenge the inferences
antiformalists draw from these conclusions. It will argue that, even
though modern statutes are central components of a common law sys-

109

Id. at 1575.
Id. at 1598–99. Merrill raises similar points while arguing that federal courts should
have only limited inherent common law powers. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, The Common
Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 12–32 (1985); Thomas W. Merrill, The
Judicial Prerogative, 12 Pace L. Rev. 327, 344–46 (1992).
110
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tem, a more careful look at common law theory reveals strong arguments for formalist interpretation of our common law statutes. But before we get too far ahead of ourselves, let us first challenge the notion
that the common law had little time or respect for statutes.
A. Classical Common Lawyers’ Views on Legislation
The standard story scripts the common lawyer as lavishing attention
on judicial decisions and ignoring statutes when he is not deriding them.
This story contains more than a few grains of truth. Lawyers like Edward Coke (1552–1634) and John Davies (1569–1626) spoke of the
common law as capturing the custom and immemorial wisdom of the
people—the “perfection of reason” that no individual or legislature
could replicate or capture in the form of words. 111 These common lawyers viewed statutes with hostility. While common law was shared, perfected reason and “the custom of the realm,” 112 Parliament produced
“arbitrary and heedless legislation” that constituted “the exercise of will
of one party over another.” 113 In terms reminiscent of a Hobbesian notion of legal authority, such common lawyers saw “the model of a command” as fitting statute law to a tee. 114 To minimize and domesticate this
alien and dangerous form of law, such common lawyers strained to read
legislation as declaratory of the common law or “relegated [it] to an insignificant corner of the space they claimed for common law.” 115 The
only salutary role Parliament played was correcting ill-advised judicial
departures from perfect, immemorial custom. 116
But that is only part of the story. Even before the Austinian positivism
that allegedly gave rise to faithful-agent theories of statutory interpretation—and even before Blackstone—an alternative interpretation of the
111

Gerald J. Postema, Classical Common Law Jurisprudence (Part I), 2 Oxford U. Commonwealth L.J. 155, 169–72 (2002) [hereinafter Postema I] (describing the “Coke-Davies
Position” on common law as custom of the realm).
112
Thomas Hedley, Speech in Parliament on Royal Impositions, in 2 Proceedings in Parliament, 1610, at 182 (Elizabeth Read Foster ed., 1966).
113
Postema II, supra note 8, at 18.
114
Id.
115
Postema I, supra note 111, at 169–72.
116
See Charles M. Gray, Editor’s Introduction to Matthew Hale, The History of the Common Law of England, at xxv (Charles M. Gray ed., 1971) (1713). Common lawyers’ skepticism toward legislation did not die in the seventeenth century. See, e.g., James Coolidge
Carter, Law: Its Origin, Growth, and Function 221 (1907) (“The popular estimate of the possibilities for good which may be realised through the enactment of law is, in my opinion,
greatly exaggerated.”).
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common law tradition afforded a much greater role for legislation. Matthew Hale (1609–1676) and his mentor John Selden (1584–1654), who
were “more sophisticated, more sceptical and more moderate” than
Coke, 117 regarded statutes, like judicial decisions, as integral to a common law that is custom of the realm. 118 For Hale, the common law had
three “formal constituents”: usage and custom, Acts of Parliament, and
judicial decisions. 119 While Hale, like us, recognized that the term
“Common Law” was often used to distinguish judicial decisions from
“Statute Law,” he held that the term derived its meaning “most truly”
from the fact that it is the shared “Law or Rule of Justice” in the kingdom—the law that is “common to the generality of all Persons, Things
and Causes.” 120 Tellingly, the very first chapter of Hale’s landmark seventeenth-century work, The History of the Common Law of England,
concerns “Statute Laws, or Acts of Parliament.” 121
This focus on legislation was no mere brush clearing. In Hale’s work,
legislation “far from being an ambiguous character, is the hero of the
piece,” serving as an engine for improving English law from medieval
times on. 122 Hale was a law reformer whose treatise on “The Amendment of the Laws” embraced careful “legislative alteration of the common law,” and his bias was as “prolegislative, as Coke’s was antilegislative.” 123 An understanding of a system in which legal change was
“effected by judicial decisions alone” would have “offended” Hale
“even if it had been accessible intellectually.” 124 In Hale’s eyes, the
common law tradition embraced legislation as an integral part of the system. Classical common law theory therefore did not unequivocally “contrast[] the reasoned and considered judgments of the courts with the arbitrary and heedless legislation of Parliament.” 125
For Hale, the difference between written statutory law and “unwritten” law was the mode in which law became valid. Written, statutory
117

Postema I, supra note 111, at 172.
See id. at 172–76 (outlining the “Hale-Selden Position” on common law as custom of
the realm).
119
Postema II, supra note 8, at 11 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Postema I,
supra note 111, at 172–76 (describing Hale’s position on the three constituents of the common law as “orthodoxy” at the time of its writing).
120
Hale, supra note 116, at 36–37.
121
Id. at 3. Hale’s History was published posthumously. Gray, supra note 116, at xiii–xv.
122
Gray, supra note 116, at xxvii–xxix.
123
Id. at xxix.
124
Id. at xxxv.
125
Postema II, supra note 8, at 18.
118
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law was valid “by virtue of having been explicitly made by an authorized law-maker.” 126 Unwritten law—either in the form of precedent, custom, or even rules embodied in parliamentary legislation that disappeared from the historical record—gained its authority by “incorporation
into the use and practice” of the common law system. 127 On these
grounds, Hale also treated Roman and canon law, which were undoubtedly committed to writing, as “Unwritten” law because the common law
chose to incorporate them in limited areas. 128 The authority of precedential norms—and statutes from other polities––depended on the courts
taking them up into the system, while extant parliamentary legislation
had inherent force of its own right by the sheer fact of enactment “according to established constitutional rules.” 129
Hale was no marginal or idiosyncratic figure, but rather represented a
significant—and arguably more sophisticated and accepted—line of
thought in the classical common law tradition. 130 In this line, statutes,
along with judicial decisions and custom, were a crucial, respected component of the common law system. More needs to be said about the nature of and relationship between these constituent parts of the common
law. Hale’s view that legislation is valid by virtue of parliamentary enactment alone could suggest a radical difference between statutes and
precedent within the common law system—perhaps even laying the
groundwork for “late nineteenth century assumptions” that written statutes are like orders of a “positivistic sovereign.” 131 Yet intellectual historians also interpret Hale as seeing legislation and precedent as manifestations of the same common law in different “modes of existence,” not
as radically different legal creatures. 132 To begin to solve this puzzle,
and to dispel the notion that classical common lawyers’ respect for statutes flowed from Hobbesian premises, it is useful to explore the com-

126

Id. at 19.
Id.; see Hale, supra note 116, at 16–17.
128
See Hale, supra note 116, at 19.
129
Postema II, supra note 8, at 19.
130
Professor Gerald Postema, a leading contemporary historian of common law thought,
places Hale’s writings on the nature of the common law system and adjudication at the center of his reconstruction of classical common law theory. See generally Postema I, supra note
111, at 172–76; Postema II, supra note 8; Gerald J. Postema, Bentham and the Common Law
Tradition 6–35 (1986) [hereinafter Postema, Bentham].
131
Eskridge, supra note 19, at 1502; Pildes, supra note 73, at 898.
132
Postema II, supra note 8, at 19.
127
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mon lawyers’ understanding of legislation itself, not just its place in the
legal system.
B. Two Models of Legislation
Jeremy Waldron’s book, Law and Disagreement, is a helpful starting
point for theorizing about legislation and legislatures. 133 There, he identifies two different conceptions of legislation: one which descends from
a sovereign legislator versus one which ascends from the custom of the
people. 134 The first, which he argues is dominant among legal theorists
today, draws a “Hobbesian picture.” 135 There, following Hobbes, Jeremy
Bentham, and John Austin, “legislative proposals [are] put forth by individuals, one of which is adopted authoritatively by the sovereignlegislator and then promulgated with the marks of valid law.” 136 The
roots of this conception, Waldron argues, trace back to the Roman law
notion that the will of the prince makes a rule law. The prince is “autonomous, independent and, to use a modern term which seems quite legitimate to employ in this context, . . . sovereign.” 137
Drawing on the work of historian-professor Walter Ullmann, Waldron
describes this theory of legislation by a unitary sovereign as the “descending” model of legislative authority. 138 This is not the only conception of legislation available, though it is one that common lawyers often
used in their polemics against legislation. 139 An alternative conception,
whose origins also predate the common law, is the “ascending” model. It
views law as an embodiment of shared custom—“the law of the people

133

Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement (1999) [hereinafter Waldron, Law and Disagrement]; see also Jeremy Waldron, The Dignity of Legislation 1 (1999) (positing that contemporary jurisprudence lacks a “model that is capable of making normative sense of legislation as a genuine form of law, of the authority that it claims, and of the demands that it
makes on the other actors in a legal system”).
134
See Waldron, Law and Disagreement, supra note 133, at 55.
135
Id. at 40.
136
Id.; see id. at 43–45 (tracing this vision’s connection with Hobbes, Bentham, and Austin).
137
Id. at 56 (quoting Walter Ullmann, Principles of Government and Politics in the Middle
Ages 19 (1961)).
138
Id.
139
See, e.g., James C. Carter, The Proposed Codification of Our Common Law 6 (Gale
2015) (1884) (contrasting a common law that by process of “natural growth . . . springs up
from, and is made by, the people” with “Codes, enacted by the arbitrary power of the sovereign, or by the authority of a legislative assembly”).
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or the law of the land, rather than the king or the will of the prince.” 140
Law “wells up from those who are subject to it, rather than being handed
down from on high.” 141 While the descending, unitary theory of authority fits neatly with a monarchical legislator, Waldron argues that the
modern analogue to the ascending, customary model is legislation by a
pluralistic assembly. 142 There, legislation emerges
from a process that is deliberative, a process distinguished not just by
its Hobbesian decisiveness, but also by the engagement with one another in parliamentary debate of all the views that might reasonably be
thought competitive with whatever legislative proposal is under consideration. Modern legislatures are structured to secure this, with rules
about representation . . . rules about hearings, rules about debates,
rules about amendments, and above all rules about voting. 143

Waldron discusses the late-medieval and feudal roots of the ascending, customary model of legislation and analyzes how the contemporary
legislative process replicates it in modern form. The ascending model
arose in England with a feudal king making decisions in consultation
with the nobility, with both parties bound by reciprocal rights and obligations. 144 Growing from this base, the rise of democratic assemblies
“was not a matter of the people seizing sovereign legislative authority
hitherto held by the monarch,” but rather “elected representatives coming to be regarded as indispensable members” of a consultative community. 145
Accordingly, while “custom and assembly-legislation look quite different as sources of law,” Waldron finds “surprising affinities” between
the two in how a group larger than a prince or a king—“the people”—
plays a central role in shaping the law. 146 Waldron finds many of these
affinities in medieval jurisprudence, 147 but essential to the present argument is identifying the links in the chain between medieval customary
140

Id.
Id.
142
See id. at 55.
143
Id. at 40.
144
See Ullmann, supra note 137, at 151–53.
145
Waldron, Law and Disagreement, supra note 133, at 59.
146
Id. at 55.
147
See id.; see also Joseph Canning, The Political Thought of Baldus de Ubaldis 100–01
(2003) (“Custom and statute do not differ in their efficient cause and its efficacy, but [rather]
in their mode and form.”).
141
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law and the modern legislation that Waldron sees as its contemporary
instantiation. Classical common law thought, I argue, helps bridge that
temporal and conceptual gap.
C. The Common Law, Including Legislation, as Custom of the Realm
In England, the ascending model of legal authority took root in the
form of the lex terrae—feudal law governing estates. 148 In time, this law
became the font for what we now know as the common law, “the third
great European system of law” after Roman and canon law. 149 In important respects, the development of common law thought is a story of
increasing identification between law and popular custom. However, the
twelfth- and thirteenth-century common lawyers who wrote the treatises
Bracton and Glanvill were more likely to link the common law with the
will of the monarch than with the customs and ways of the people. 150 By
1528, however, Christopher St. Germain was tracing linkages between
the technical doctrine of the common law and the “general customs of
old time used through all the realm.” 151 His conception of custom was
“unambiguously populist.” 152
The great lawyer John Selden, in turn, saw the superiority of the
common law not in its antiquity, but in how it fit the needs and ways of
the people subject to it. 153 Similarly, he traced the common law’s authority to its customary links. Living in accordance with custom was, to Selden, a form of consent. Identifying custom at the root of common law
made it possible to claim that this positive law grew up from the community. 154 By the late seventeenth century it was unremarkable for Hale
148

See Ullmann, supra note 137, at 166–67; see also Postema, Bentham, supra note 130, at
3 (“Classical Common Law theory was born at a time when, emerging from feudalism, modern English society and the modern state were taking shape.”).
149
Ullmann, supra note 137, at 167; see Hale, supra note 116, at 36 (stating that the common law “[t]is called sometimes by Way of Eminence, Lex Terrae”); Ullmann, supra note
137, at 166 (“If we may borrow a term from later generations we may justifiably call the lex
terrae the early thirteenth-century expression for the English common law.”).
150
See Alan Cromartie, The Idea of Common Law as Custom, in The Nature of Customary Law: Legal Historical and Philosophical Perspectives 203, 204–206 (Amanda PerreauSaussine & James B. Murphy eds., 2007).
151
Id. at 211 (quoting Christopher St. Germain, Doctor and Student 35 (T.F.T. Plunkett &
J.L. Barton eds., 1974)).
152
Id. at 211.
153
See Harold J. Berman, The Origins of Historical Jurisprudence: Coke, Seldon, Hale 103
Yale L.J. 1651, 1698 (1994).
154
See id. at 1699–700.
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to identify the “custom of the realm” as “the great substratum” of the
common law. 155 Common lawyers by then read the king’s promise in
Magna Carta to honor the lex terrae as a pledge to adhere to this common law. This equating of lex terrae and common law allowed common
lawyers to put mutual obligation and consensual governance between
king and subjects at the center of English law, supporting the claim that
“the common law” is a basic component of the English legal system. 156
It comes as no surprise that Hale described Hobbes’s conception of
the sovereign—an individual dictating authoritative rules unconstrained
by anything but conscience and God’s judgment—as “utterly falce,”
“agst all Naturall Justice,” “Pernicious to the Govern.,” “Destructive to
the Comon good,” and “Without any Shaddow of Law or reason to Support them.” 157 The common law emerged in opposition to political theories of absolutism that sought to centralize authority in sovereign monarchs who made law “guided by nothing but their own assessments of
the demands of justice, expediency, and the common good.” 158 Common
lawyers “reasserted the medieval idea” that law is discovered and expressed by “king, Parliament, or judges,” not made and imposed by them
from above. 159
Classical common lawyers did not view the law discovered and expressed as pertaining to universal, rational truths (or at least not directly), but rather as “historically evidenced national custom.” 160 This repeated refrain that common law represents the custom of the realm
dovetails with Waldron’s ascending model of legislation: The law is
“something held in common, something essentially ours, something in-

155

Hale, supra note 116, at 84; see Cromartie, supra note 150, at 221–22 (discussing Hale).
Hale, supra note 116, at 36 (stating that when Magna Carta uses the term “Lex Terrae, . . . certainly the Common Law is at least principally intended by those Words”);
Ullmann, supra note 137, at 167 (“The ingenuity of the makers of Magna Carta in applying
the term lex terrae is indeed in no need of comment.”).
157
Reflections by the Lrd. Cheife Justice Hale on Mr. Hobbes His Dialogue of the Lawe
(1835), reprinted in 5 W.S. Holdsworth, A History of English Law 500, 509 (1927).
158
Postema, Bentham, supra note 130, at 3–4.
159
Id.
160
Id. at 4; see also Philip Hamburger, Law and Judicial Duty 51–52 (2008) (explaining
the classical understanding of common law as a form of custom “recorded in popular
memory” and instantiated in the “use and practice” of the courts); Brian Simpson, The
Common Law and Legal Theory, in A.W.B. Simpson, Legal Theory and Legal History: Essays on the Common Law 359, 373 (1987) (identifying and embracing “the traditional notion
of the common law as custom, which was standard form in the older writers” like Hale and
Blackstone).
156
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deed which only exists to the extent that it is embedded in and part of a
shared way of life”; furthermore, “metaphors of organic growth rather
than artificial innovation” will more commonly describe substantive
change in the system. 161 Hale and Selden understood common law as
custom to be “constantly changing” through interpretation and “sometimes outright legislation.” 162 Over time and changed circumstances, the
law would change, but what mattered was the continuity of the legal system’s framework and the law’s congruence with the “‘frame’ and ‘disposition’ of the people” subject to it. 163 The appeal to custom, in this
sense, is not a claim about “historical origins” or the particular form or
instantiation of law, but a claim about law’s “essential nature and its
foundations or authority.” 164 For this reason, the three “constituents” of
the common law—statute, judicial decisions, and custom—are three different “modes of existence of law, or forms of legal validity” for law
grounded in a shared sense of reasonableness. 165
Few today surpass Waldron’s championing of legislation in the Anglo-American legal system. But if he is correct that our system of legislation is a bottom-up affair, and if this model arose in protean form in
twelfth-century England as customary feudal law, 166 the common law
tradition appears to form links in the chain from medieval customary
law to legislation as we know it. This implication is less counterintuitive
when we recall how Hale saw legislation as integral to the common law
system. In fact, “the increasing salience of customary law” in common
law thought “owed something to the role played by statute” as an increasingly important means of legal change. 167 Legislation and judicial
precedent are different “modes of existence” of the same common law in
161

Waldron, Law and Disagreement, supra note 133, at 56–57.
Postema I, supra note 111, at 173.
163
Gray, supra note 116, at xxvii (stating that for Hale, “only one feature of the [legal] system was clearly immemorial . . . : the constitutional frame” of the English polity); Postema I,
supra note 111, at 175.
164
Gerald J. Postema, Some Roots of Our Notion of Precedent, in Precedent in Law 8, 16
(Laurence Goldstein ed., 1987).
165
Postema II, supra note 8, at 11, 19 (internal quotation marks omitted).
166
See Ullmann, supra note 137, at 155–56 (describing how the notion of descending, theocratic kingship gave way to ascending, feudal notions of kingship during the reigns of
Kings Henry II, Richard I, and John).
167
Cromartie, supra note 150, at 213–14 (referring to the role statutes played in “putting
through the English Reformation” and stating that “[i]f statute had power to alter the country’s religion, the obvious corollary was that the highest law was a law made by popular consent”).
162
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that they seek to channel popular custom. And while they operate
through different methods, neither are limited to an understanding of legal development as top-down imposition of the will of a sovereign (or
sovereign few). 168
III. LEGISLATING IN THE COMMON LAW TRADITION
In the common law tradition, both legislation and judicial decision
making seek to develop law that reflects the customs and beliefs of those
subject to it. This shows a basic connection between decisional and statutory law. For many statutory antiformalists, this shared root is methodologically crucial: If “common law and statutes” are not speciously segregated as a conceptual matter, the style of reasoning in common law
adjudication, not formalist restraint, should prevail in statutory interpretation. 169 This Part drills down on the premise underlying this interpretive conclusion, exploring how the development of precedent and statutes are congruent in the common law tradition. It does so first by
distilling what classical common lawyers thought to be distinctive about
the “artificial reason” of the common law jurist—a topic that is the most
frequent focus of common law theory then and today. This Part then
identifies parallels between this artificial reason of common law adjudication and current methods of legislating in the United States. These
similarities show continuity between judicial decision making and legislation in the common law tradition that persists today. As will become
clearer in Part IV, however, many of these structural similarities point
toward formalism in the interpretation of such “common law” statutes.
A. Artificial Reason of the Common Law
The first step is appreciating what common lawyers thought to be distinctive about their practice. Classical common lawyers frequently and
unfavorably compared the natural reason of an ordinary person, a monarch, or “Casuists, Schoolmen, [and] Morall Philosophers” with the “ar-

168

Cf. Geoffrey Goldsworthy, The Sovereignty of Parliament 109 (1999) (stating for many
common lawyers “the authority of the common law and that of Parliament were one and the
same: the common law embodied the wisdom of the community, as expressed in immemorial customs,” while that wisdom “lives still in that which the law calls the ‘reason of the
kingdom,’ the votes and ordinances of Parliament”).
169
See Strauss, The Common Law, supra note 7; Strauss, Resegregating, supra note 54.
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tificial reason and judgment” of the common law. 170 The “unstable reason” of those untutored in the law will fall into “jangling and Contradiction” 171 and reflect not disciplined, shared reason, but “the arbitrary incursion of political will.” 172 This notion of artificial reason is as
controversial as it is central to common law theory. For critics like Bentham, artificial reason was a façade that “Judge & Co.” used to protect
their power and prestige. 173 For common lawyers, it was essential to the
enterprise, though rarely defined with precision.
As Professor Gerald Postema explains, common law’s artificial reason was pragmatic and contextual, not abstract and systematic. 174 Unlike
Bentham’s legislator “surveying the problems” and formulating systematic rules from on high, common lawyers worked close to the ground,
“with their eyes down,” to find practical solutions to discrete problems. 175 As a corollary to this pragmatic, contextual orientation, aspirations for systemic theoretical coherence played a limited role in the
common law. To its critics and champions alike, the common law was a
corpus “wholly without conformity, and altogether dismembered” and
“a chaos with a full index.” 176 Tennyson described that “codeless myriad
of precedent” as a “wilderness of single instances.” 177 According to legal
historian Brian Simpson, the “common law is more like a muddle than a

170

Holdsworth, supra note 157, at 503; Prohibitions del Roy, in Edward Coke, 12 The Reports of Sir Edward Coke, 63, 64–65 (London, E. & R. Nutt & R. Gosling 1727). See generally Postema II, supra note 8, at 1–11 (giving an overview of the classical common lawyers’
conceptions of “artificial reason”).
171
Holdsworth, supra note 157, at 503.
172
Postema II, supra note 8, at 2.
173
Postema, Bentham, supra note 130, at 273–75.
174
Postema’s reconstruction of this “artificial reason” is the most sophisticated and prominent rendition in contemporary jurisprudence. In addition, after writing what is considered an
authoritative book on the common law tradition and Jeremy Bentham, see Postema, Bentham, supra note 130, Professor Postema was selected to author the chapter on the philosophy of the common law in the magisterial Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and the Philosophy of Law.
175
Postema II, supra note 8, at 3 (quoting S.F.C. Milsom, Historical Foundations of the
Common Law 7 (1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
176
Postema II, supra note 8, at 5–6 (quoting John Dodderidge, The English Lawyer 190
(1631)); T.E. Holland, Essays upon the Form of the Law 171 (London, Butterworths 1870)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
177
Lord Alfred Tennyson, Aylmer’s Field, in The Poetic Works of Alfred, Lord Tennyson,
240, 240–52 (W.J. Rolfe ed., Cambridge ed. 1898) (1793).
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system,” and the common law mind is “repelled by brevity, lucidity, and
system.” 178
The classical common lawyer, rather than seeking a small set of principles uniting whole fields of law, 179 was content to have small pockets
of the law work and make sense, even if the broader doctrinal structure
did not hang together in one elegant constellation. Although common
law thought does not categorically forswear the search for principles
across legal domains, “it recognises that often practical life can be better
managed intelligently when portions or domains are treated as relatively
discrete.” 180 To seek only “local coherence” along those lines is usually
“a more manageable task and enables more supple responses to changing circumstances.” 181 Very often these pragmatic preferences will maintain rules and “categories that may appear, from a more global perspective, to be unsupported by good reason” or a legal regime that “from a
more theoretical perspective, might have appeared to be a lack of systemic coherence.” 182 This feature of common law practice frustrated academic lawyers steeped in the civil law tradition, who wanted judges to
undertake “learned explication” that would make “English law more
complete and rational.” 183 Common law reasoning, moreover, was “discursive, that is, as a matter of deliberative reasoning and argument in an
interlocutory, indeed forensic, context.” 184 Even the wisest individual
could not reach sound conclusions about the common law by reasoning
alone. Rather, practitioners had to present and evaluate arguments in the
178
Simpson, supra note 160, at 24; see also Eben Moglen, Legal Fictions and Common
Law Legal Theory: Some Historical Reflections, 10 Tel-Aviv U. Stud. L. 33, 33 (1990)
(“[T]he distinguishing marks of the common law . . . are its resistance to systematization, its
refusal to consider more than the case at hand, and [its resistance to] attempts at ‘academic’
or comprehensively analytical statements of substantive rules and their presuppositions.”).
179
See Gerald J. Postema, Law’s System: The Necessity of System in Common Law, 2014
N.Z. L. Rev. 69, 69–70 [hereinafter Postema, Law’s System] (criticizing modern attempts at
this systemization).
180
Id. at 97.
181
Id.; cf. Barbara Baum Levenbook, The Role of Coherence in Legal Reasoning, 3 Law
& Phil. 355, 368 (1984) (arguing that in legal reasoning “room has to be made for what can
be called ‘area specific coherence’”).
182
Postema, Law’s System, supra note 179, at 97; Postema II, supra note 8, at 5; see Hamburger, supra note 160, at 38 (“[C]ommon lawyers did not forgo their attention to reason, but
they were . . . confident that common law was binding even if it was unreasonable or contrary to natural law.”).
183
Hamburger, supra note 160, at 116.
184
Postema II, supra note 8, at 7 (spelling of “discoursive” de-Anglicized for expositional
purposes).
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structured, indeed solemn, forum of a court of justice. 185 The ritualized
argument of the courtroom “disciplined” individuals’ reasoning by subjecting arguments “to cross-examination in a public forum according to
public standards of success and failure” and forcing disputants “to strive
for common judgment in the face of dispute and disagreement.” 186 Relatedly, artificial reason was “common or shared” reason, a competence
learned through this practice of argument and immersion in the life and
experience of the community. 187 Artificial reason is different than the
speculative reason of the philosophers, and common law theory’s corresponding model of adjudication rejects the notion that courts in challenging cases simply appeal to natural reason or conscience. 188
Artificial reason is a product of discipline, argument, and experience
that seeks to identify, or approximate by construction (“artifice”), the
community’s shared reason on social problems. Artificial reason aspires
to find the “convergence of the views and judgments of the larger community, and forging and maintaining a common sense of reasonableness.” 189 In contrast to the speculation of the philosopher or the isolated
judgment of sovereigns, artificial reason is “social [as] opposed to individual.” 190 Accordingly, “[s]alience, not vision, and pragmatic convergence,” not broad “theoretical coherence” with a “single moral vision or
systematic rationality” are the common law’s aim. 191 Requiring broad
coherence under such demanding criteria will often frustrate the search
for common reason.
Finally, even though the validity of a piece of artificial reasoning
turns on its compliance with a shared sense of reasonableness, the resulting law must offer public guidance. While not prioritizing clear rules as
much as some later theorists, common law thought comprehended that

185
See id. (quoting 9 Edward Coke, The Reports of Sir Edward Coke xiv (George Wilson
ed., Dublin, James Moore 1793) (“[N]o one man alone with all his true and uttermost labours, nor all the actors in them themselves by themselves out of a court of justice nor in
court without solemn argument . . . could ever have [come to the right reason of the rule].”
(emphasis added))).
186
Id. at 8.
187
Id. at 8–9 (emphasis omitted).
188
See id. at 9. The classical common lawyer rejects “the Hobbesian idea that once the
sources of law run out the judge must appeal to his natural reason, or the civilian
view . . . that the judge must appeal to conscience.” Id.
189
Id. at 10.
190
Id. at 11.
191
Id. at 10.

COPYRIGHT © 2015, VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

2015]

Reading Statutes in the Common Law Tradition

1389

its rules must be “intelligible to those who are subject to it.” 192 Those
rules must “make practical sense” and broadcast “what kind of behavior
the law calls for and . . . give them some reason for complying.” 193 This
guidance has the substantive component of practical sensibility, but also
suggests a formal aspect. The common law offers guidance because of
its publicity. Not only is the process of reasoning public, the resulting
guidance “is addressed in public to a public of rational agents that it
seeks to guide.” 194 Thus, the common law offers a “theoretically untidy,
but practically accessible and widely and publicly intelligible, framework for legal reasoning.” 195 What it lacks in elegance, it makes up for
in “public accessibility and with it effective public accountability.” 196
B. Legislating as Artificial Reasoning
In case law, the artificial reason of classical common law looks for
workable solutions to particular problems through a disciplined practice
of public argument and deliberation. It aims to forge a shared understanding of what is reasonable that, in part because of its reasonableness,
offers public and normative guidance. If sophisticated, orthodox common law theory also includes legislation as a critical element, it would
not be surprising to see statutes develop in a fashion similar to the judicial reasoning that is the more frequent focus of common law theory.
In fact, central features of statute making in United States federal law
show parallels with, or at least fruitful analogies to, the artificial reason
that develops doctrine in common law adjudication. It is harder to generalize, but similar arguments may also apply to much state legislation. 197 This analysis will focus on federal law for simplicity’s sake and
because federal law offers the strongest challenge to the argument that
the common law tradition remains relevant. It is a frequent refrain that
federal courts, unlike state courts, are not general common law courts. 198
192

Postema, Law’s System, supra note 179, at 88–89.
Id.
194
Id. at 89.
195
Id. at 103.
196
Id. (emphasis omitted).
197
The success of codification movements in some jurisdictions and the prevalence of uniform laws in many others may weaken the analogies between legislation and common law
development discussed infra note 235 and accompanying text.
198
See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 312 (1981) (“Federal courts, unlike
state courts, are not general common-law courts and do not possess a general power to develop and apply their own rules of decision.”) (citations omitted). See generally Nelson, State
193
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The argument here is that even in federal law the common law tradition
persists, at least in the style of legislation. Others, notably Professor Peter Strauss, have flagged this resemblance. 199 This Section develops that
insight in light of classical common law theory.
Take first how common law reasoning and development was pragmatic, contextual, and nonsystematic. Federal legislation is famously (or
notoriously) piecemeal and reactive, responding in incremental fashion
to discrete and particularly salient problems. 200 Even systemic reform
statutes like the Affordable Care Act and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act build
off existing structures and leave wide swaths of problems unanswered,
usually for administrative agencies to resolve in discrete rulemakings.
Less common are statutes on the model of continental codes, which
“emerge [as] a single legislative act, after exquisite intellectual consideration” and are amended only after similar comprehensive study. 201 Federal legislation may not be a “chaos with an index,” but it bears recalling
that the United States Code is an after-the-fact reorganization and indexing of strands of session laws of varying size, enacted at different times,
targeting discrete problems. 202
This particularism and inelegance is in part, as Waldron has argued, a
feature of bottom-up legislation produced when a large group of people
with diverse views come to agreement through deliberation and argument, not “Hobbesian decisiveness” from above. 203 In fact, a common
criticism of the ascending style of legislation is that nothing “coherent”
can arise from the “babel” of multiple legislators’ “cross-cutting proand Federal Models, supra note 77 (discussing state court use of common law to resolve silences in statutes, unlike federal courts which find answers in the statute itself); Pojanowski,
supra note 7 (examining federal courts’ lack of common law power, as opposed to state court
powers, and their treatment of statutes).
199
Strauss, The Common Law, supra note 7.
200
See id. at 225 (describing the American tendency toward “common law legislating,”
namely “the practice of creating statutes to achieve marginal changes in existing law in response to perceived deficiencies, rather than legislating comprehensively as continental
codes seek to do”).
201
Id. at 235.
202
See Tobias A. Dorsey, Some Reflections on Not Reading Statutes, 10 Green Bag 2d
283, 284 (2007) (noting that rather than looking to authoritative session laws published in
serial form in the United States Statutes at Large, lawyers overwhelmingly use the U.S.
Code, which “is––no disrespect intended––a Frankenstein’s monster of session laws”).
203
Waldron, Law and Disagreement, supra note 133, at 40 (“For us, it matters that legislation should emerge from a process that is deliberative, a process distinguished not just by its
Hobbesian decisiveness, but also by the engagement with one another in parliamentary debate . . . .” (emphasis omitted)).
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posals and counter-proposals.” 204 The descending, unitary model of law
has greater potential for systemic legislation because centralization of
authority (whether through a ruler/ruling group or deference to expertauthors) reduces the risk that differing opinions will shatter consensus
around a global proposal.
Any coherence in bottom-up legislation will, like common law precedent, tend to be “local” in character, for it can be challenging enough to
secure agreement on one proposal, let alone the corpus of legislation as a
whole. Even with respect to a proposed solution to a particular problem,
broad coherence in bottom-up legislation is unlikely. Among large
groups, there may be substantial disagreement; even if legislators share
the same particular goal and general values, they may disagree about the
means of pursuing a goal or the tradeoffs against other aims. Ascending
legislation will often be the product of compromise, leaving coherence
an admirable aim, but not always a feasible one. 205 Federal scholars, particularly formalists, appreciate how such compromise often leads to
awkwardness rather than elegance in legislation. 206
The legislative process in ascending regimes will not have the character of ordinary conversation, but will rather be a formal, rule-laden, and
procedure-driven enterprise that aims at including a wide range of views
from diverse representatives while also structuring that discussion to focus on a limited set of proposals. 207 For large assemblies there is rarely a
seamless translation from policy ideal to statute; a proposal must travel
the gauntlet of legislative procedure and often will not look the same
coming out as it entered. 208 Further, where some classical common law204

Id. at 53.
See Jeremy Waldron, Legislating with Integrity, 72 Fordham L. Rev. 373, 386 (2003);
see also Manning, supra note 79, at 1304 (“[L]egislation often represents unknowable compromise, [and] that compromise often requires legislators to embrace means that do not fully
effectuate the ends that inspired the law’s enactment.”).
206
See Manning, supra note 79, at 1310 (“[S]tatutes typically represent the product of
compromise, and compromises are not always tidy.”).
207
See Waldron, Law and Disagreement, supra note 133, at 70 (“[W]hat happens in the
legislature [is] more like proceedings than conversation.” (emphasis omitted)); id. at 40
(“Modern legislatures are structured to secure [reasoned deliberation], with rules about representation . . . rules about hearings, rules about debates, rules about amendments, and above
all rules about voting.”).
208
See John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 Va. L. Rev. 419, 424
(2005) (“[The legislative process] conditions [Congress’s] ability to translate raw policy impulses or intentions into finished legislation. For them, intended meaning never emerges unfiltered; it must survive a process that includes committee approval, logrolling, the need for
floor time, threatened filibusters, conference committees, veto threats, and the like.”).
205
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yers skeptical of parliamentary legislation feared the jangling contradictions of the mob, a more charitable and nuanced view could discern intricate procedures that structure the chaos and reach outcomes that,
however inelegant, are not entirely arbitrary. 209
This formalized, nearly ritualized process of deliberation is the parliamentary analogue to the classical common lawyer’s “disciplined,” indeed “solemn,” practice of artificial reason. 210 The structure and order
that mark each stage of legislative deliberation prevent cacophony and
allow legislators to benefit from diverse “perspectives to come up with
better decisions than any one of them could make on his own.” 211 Like
common lawyers, legislators draw on this collected wisdom and experience while reasoning and arguing “in a public forum according to public
standards of success and failure.” 212 To put a twist on a classical common law theme, structured deliberation in large assemblies, rather than
the “the moral vision of any individual,” best secures “effective practical
outcomes through convergence of judgment on common solutions.” 213 In
this light, Coke’s claim that “no one man alone . . . out of a court of justice nor in court without solemn argument” can discover the common
law 214 recapitulates itself in Waldron’s hypothesis that when many gather to deliberate under parliamentary discipline, each person contributes
“to a practical intelligence that outstrips the intelligence of which any
one of them is capable.” 215

209
See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Law and Public Choice: A Critical Introduction 49–50 (1991) (“Legislatures apparently use a variety of structures, rules, and norms to
ameliorate the problem of cycling majorities. As a result, legislatures possess ‘structureinduced equilibrium.’”); id. at 50 (“[These] various institutional features of legislatures may
promote stability and coherence.”). For a discussion of shifting views in public and social
choice theory about legislative rationality, see Manning, supra note 79, at 1293–303.
210
Cf. Postema II, supra note 8, at 8.
211
Waldron, Law and Disagreement, supra note 133, at 72; see id. at 71 (“[A legislature]
must deliberate at every stage and in every aspect of its proceedings . . . so that a procedure
involving drafting, consultation, committee hearings, bicameralism, conference committees,
first, second and third readings, and so on, can add up to a structured but unified legislative
process.”). For a discussion of how the intricacy of legislative procedures assist reasoned
decision making, see Ekins, supra note 99, at 164–69, 224–30.
212
Postema II, supra note 8, at 8; see Holdsworth, supra note 157, at 503 (discussing the
superiority of common lawyers’ experience in “[c]onversation between man and man”).
213
Postema II, supra note 8, at 10.
214
Coke, supra note 185, at xiv; see Postema II, supra note 8, at 7 (“right reason”).
215
Waldron, Law and Disagreement, supra note 133, at 72 (citing Aristotle, Politics, bk.
III, ch. 11, at 66–68 (Stephen Everson ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (c. 350 B.C.E.)).
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The practice and procedures of large assembly legislation, like classical common law, aim at “common judgment in the face of dispute and
disagreement.” 216 In federal legislation, some of these procedures are entrenched in the written Constitution. One of the most important of such
structures—the requirement of bicameralism and presentment—has the
effect of forging common judgment by encouraging compromise. The
requirement that both chambers of Congress and the President agree on
the same proposal creates an effective supermajority requirement for
legislation, forcing political majorities to negotiate with minorities if
they want a proposal to succeed. 217 Thus not only does federal legislative procedure allow Members of Congress to pool and direct their
knowledge, it can force dominant coalitions to incorporate concerns of
the opposition in reaching practical solutions to problems.
As defenders and critics of bicameralism and presentment have noted,
these veto-gates can further limit legislative coherence. 218 Legislation
that survives the federal crucible commends the support of a supermajority of plural voices, including those who may have initially began the
process as uncommitted or in the opposition. Custom, the root of the ascending model of law, connotes an informal, near-unanimity that no
complex legal system can depend upon exclusively. But the many-gated
federal legislative process, by regularly producing law that more than a
threadbare majority is willing to accept, constructs—artifices—through
procedural form a kind of legislative custom of the second best. Such
legislation does not grow from the natural, organic consensus of a homogenous community, and many policies that slimmer majorities prefer

216

Postema II, supra note 8, at 8.
See John F. Manning, Competing Presumptions about Statutory Competence, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 2009, 2039 (2006) (“[P]olitical scientists have shown that by dividing the legislative process among three institutions answering to distinct constituencies, the bicameralism
and presentment requirements . . . in effect create a supermajority requirement . . . . [That
requirement] assign[s] political minorities extraordinary power to stop (or at least slow) the
passage of legislation and, more important, to insist upon compromise as the price of their
assent.” (footnote omitted)).
218
See Ekins, supra note 99, at 176 (“[American legislatures] may enact legislation that is
not fit to be chosen by a reasoning person, because it is rendered incoherent by the various
riders insisted on by veto-players.”); Manning, supra note 217, at 2010 (“The design of the
legislative process emphasizes the need for compromise, and compromises are often complex, awkward, and even incoherent . . . .”).
217
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will not become law. 219 Yet resulting statutes will reflect what a large
portion of the community’s representatives agrees to accept as their own
law. 220
Finally, legislative debate and resulting statutes comport with the
common law’s aspirations for “public accessibility and with it effective
public accountability.” 221 To be sure, much deliberation occurs behind
closed doors; committee reports may be crafted more to anticipate litigation than to capture history; and meticulously recorded legislative debate
may resemble Kabuki Theater more than Mr. Smith Goes to Washington.
But one component of the process unites deliberating legislators, the observing public, and later readers: the formal legislative proposal under
consideration. 222 This text, like the common law as conceived by classical theorists, “is addressed in public to a public of rational agents that it
seeks to guide.” 223
This emphasis on canonical text is in tension with the common law
tradition’s denial that its law can be captured in a definitive form of
words. 224 But as Waldron and others have argued persuasively, canonical text is critical for rational deliberation by large, diverse groups. 225
While a small, leading cadre may be able to function with tacit, conversational understandings, the absence of a formal proposal gives debates

219
But see Farber & Frickey, supra note 209, at 61–62 (“[B]ecause pure majority rule is
incoherent . . . . a viable democracy requires that preferences be shaped by public discourse
and processed by political institutions so that meaningful decisions can emerge.”).
220
Cf. id. at 62 (“When our institutions work properly, they have a valid claim to represent
the public interest.”).
221
Postema, Law’s System, supra note 179, at 103 (emphasis omitted).
222
See Waldron, Law and Disagreement, supra note 133, at 82 (“[T]he positing of a formulated text as the resolution under discussion provides a focus for the ordering of deliberation at every stage.”).
223
Postema, Law’s System, supra note 179, at 89.
224
See Simpson, supra note 160, at 16 (“[T]he general position in the common law is that
it lacks an authoritative authentic text . . . .”); cf. Ronald Dworkin, How to Read the Civil
Rights Act, in A Matter of Principle 316, 319 (1985) [hereinafter: Dworkin, Civil Rights]
(distinguishing between a “statute, which is a canonical set of sentences enacted by Congress, and the legislation created by that statute, that is, the set of legal rights, duties, powers,
permissions, or prohibitions the statute brings into existence or confirms”).
225
See Waldron, Law and Disagreement, supra note 133, at 81 (“[T]he determinacy of that
proposition, as formulated and as amended, is important for establishing a sense that we are
all orienting our actions in voting to the same object.”); see also Ekins, supra note 99, at 234
(“The open proposal that legislators vote to adopt defines the legislative act. The content of
that proposal must be capable of being known . . . .”).
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in large bodies an “air of babel-like futility.” 226 A canonical proposal ensures “participants’ contributions are relevant to one another and that
they are not talking at cross purposes.” 227 For this reason, the structured,
deliberative process of bottom-up legislative reasoning and canonical
legislative proposals are mutually reinforcing. 228 Common law legislation—the development of ascending, customary law by the hands of a
deliberating multitude—requires a formality in exposition that common
law adjudication does not (or perhaps, given the increasing formality of
judicial decision making, used to not require 229).
C. Summary and Caveats
In classical form, the artificial reason of the common law pertained to
the “convergence of the views and judgments of the larger community,
and forging and maintaining a common sense of reasonableness.” 230 Its
lodestars were “salience,” not broad moral vision, and “pragmatic convergence, not theoretical coherence.” 231 Common lawyers constructed
this artifice of custom through a “disciplined practice of argument and
disputation in a public forum,” which they saw as giving the bench and
bar wisdom, insight, and an ability to speak for the community that
eluded individual rulers and philosophers. 232 This law was, ultimately,
common law because it was shared, fit to the complexion and the Constitution of the people and, however indirectly, because it arose from their
customs and drew on their norms. 233

226
Waldron, Law and Disagreement, supra note 133, at 81; see id. at 82 (surmising that
perhaps “a one-person deliberative body” or a “small group or junta” could do without formal proposals).
227
Id.
228
See id. at 80 (“My hunch is that this textual canonicity and . . . procedural formality . . . are connected . . . . [D]ebating rules are oriented towards and ordered by the idea that
at any time there is a specific proposal under discussion.”).
229
See Simpson, supra note 160, at 24 (hypothesizing that the “breakdown in the cohesion
of the common law” and the accompanying press for authoritative doctrinal rules stems in
part from the fact that it is no longer overseen by “12 men in scarlet,” but rather “well over a
hundred”); Peter M. Tiersma, The Textualization of Precedent, 82 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1187,
1187–88 (2006) (describing how judicial opinions have become more formal in explaining
their holdings and how that has affected practicing lawyers).
230
Postema II, supra note 8, at 10.
231
Id.
232
Id.
233
See Hale, supra note 116, at 36–38.
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The incremental, pragmatic, compromise-driven fashion of common
law legislation similarly and, in contemporary contexts, crucially, allows
law to remain “custom transformed, and not merely the will or reason of
the lawmaker” descending from the top. 234 A form of artificial reason is
visible in the operations of legislatures of common law legal systems
like our own: Its focus on salience emphasizes the importance of a particular legislative text. Its pragmatic, reactive, incremental style of law
development migrates to a legislative process that downplays systemic
coherence. The common law’s desire for normative convergence recapitulates in legislative compromise that sacrifices elegance for widespread acceptance. Legislation in common law fashion too emphasizes
the centrality of procedure that disciplines argument to draw on the wisdom of the many in a fashion that surpasses the acuity of any one visionary. All told, it is a bottom-up, pluralist, and sometimes chaotic style
of law that more often than civilian systems eschews deference to rationalist experts bearing white papers and finely reticulated, comprehensive legislative schemes.
In these respects, the development of common law legislation is congruent with the reasoning in common law adjudication. One might object that this rendition of the legislative process is an overly romantic
one. After all, per its critics, Congress is gridlocked, polarized, and
pointlessly bombastic. 235 This objection is not persuasive. If champions
of common law adjudication (and interpretive antiformalism) can theorize based on an idealized judge, sketching an ideal type for the cognate
form of legislating simply compares aspirational apples to apples. Furthermore, the model of common law legislation assumes that ordinary
politics is a messy, often frustrating enterprise. To the extent that impatience with Congress centers on the body’s unwillingness to speedily enact systematic legislation supported by a narrow majority, that objection
goes to the advisability of common law legislation and its compromiseinducing veto-gates. That distaste may be well founded as a matter of
political theory, but it does not disturb the parallel between common law
adjudication and legislation.
234

Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition
556 (1983).
235
See, e.g., Robert G. Kaiser, Even When It Succeeds, Congress Fails, Wash. Post, May
26, 2013, at B1; David Nakamura & Zachary A. Goldfarb, Obama Assails House Inaction on
Immigration, Wash. Post, July 1, 2014, at A3 (“If Congress will not do their job, at least we
can do ours.”).
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Nevertheless, the resemblance between the two modes of legal development is not complete. The range of available positions and considerations for compromise will usually be wider for legislatures than courts.
Legislatures have less of an obligation to be consistent with earlier decisions, and judicial negotiation, even if considered within the pale, has
fewer logs to roll. 236 Indeed, the consensus classical common lawyers
sought in judicial reasoning harkened more to discovery of unknown
agreement than brokered deals. Furthermore, Congress, unlike the courts
considering a particular case, can delegate decisions to other institutions
like administrative agencies. 237 A legislature also has more freedom than
a court to not decide when no clear solution to a problem emerges. 238
These differences may have implications for statutory interpretation and
the common law, but they do not obviously point toward the antiformalism advocated under the banner of the common law. 239
One final qualification: This work leaves for another day the role of
administrative agencies in statutory interpretation and the common law
tradition. To some, agencies are today’s true practitioners of the common law. 240 If so, a common-law-inspired administrative law would aim
at cultivating the virtues and practice of artificial reason in the administrative process. To others, modern agency power and practice is an
anathema to the common law system and an unwelcome return of the
centralized, descending law of the royal prerogative and Star Cham-

236

This may be more a difference of degree than kind. Even if Congress is unconstrained
by the work of previous legislation, and even if courts are not strongly inclined to seek global coherence, it is hard for a legislature to escape the practical and interpretive effects of other legislation, especially in instances of ambiguity or vagueness. See Martin Krygier, The
Traditionality of Statutes, 1 Ratio Juris 20, 30 (1988) (“Statutes arrive into legal orders in
which much of the available space is filled . . . . [W]hat they do not change will remain.
Where it is deemed relevant they will be read in light of what remains. And that is usually a
lot.”).
237
Again, this may be a difference of degree given the role the jury plays (or used to play)
in common law systems or even judicial deference to administrative interpretations of unclear statutory provisions. Regarding the latter, Congress is the formal delegator, but given
that the legislature’s delegation is usually implicit (or a “fiction” in the words of Justice
Scalia), it is sensible to attribute this delegation to the courts. See John Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 Tex. L. Rev. 113, 189–211 (1998).
238
Yet again, this could be a difference of degree, especially for appellate courts with discretionary review. See also Alexander M. Bickel, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 Harv.
L. Rev. 40, 40–42 (1961) (praising use of doctrines like justiciability to avoid judicial resolution of controversial questions on the merits).
239
See infra Section V.A.
240
See Sunstein, supra note 14, at 1019.
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ber. 241 If that is so, a more radical revision of administrative law would
be necessary to restore the judicial and legislative aspects of our common law to the courts and the legislatures.
With these caveats in place, it is time to consider the interpretive implications of this congruence between common law development in the
courts and legislatures.
IV. INTERPRETING LEGISLATION IN THE COMMON LAW TRADITION
The previous Parts demonstrated parallels between the work of courts
and legislatures in a common law system. Nonformalist interpreters
draw on this congruence to argue that, because the line between precedent and statute in a common law system is artificial, the formalist’s
constraint in the statutory domain is misguided. While not without basis,
this inference is problematic, but not because the common law tradition
is irrelevant in our federal system of separated powers. Rather, this justification for dynamic interpretation faces challenges on its own common
law terms. Not only are there unappreciated resemblances between formalist statutory interpretation and common law judicial reasoning, but
there is also a strong argument for formalism on the grounds that the
legislature is the superior artificial reasoner in a common law system.
“Superior” here does not mean that the content of statutes are necessarily better as matters of moral truth or ideal policy, but rather that legislating assemblies have a greater capacity to channel general customs and
bridge disagreements in a sound, reliable, and normatively appealing
fashion. 242
A. Classical Common Lawyers and Statutory Interpretation
Common law theory doubtless provides support for judicial flexibility
with enacted legislation. Many classical common lawyers claimed that
the artificial reason of the common law perfected inferior legislation.
Legislation—in that era the work of King-in-Parliament—was posed as

241

See Hamburger, supra note 15, at 26–29.
That legislatures may enact morally erroneous statutes in a valid fashion is not alone
persuasive. Courts may err as well. Furthermore, even unapologetic natural lawyers believe
that on many questions of law and policy there is a wide range of reasonably available options. In those (many) circumstances, legal authority is necessary to choose intelligibly
among those valid options. See John Finnis, The Truth in Legal Positivism, in The Autonomy of Law: Essays on Legal Positivism 195, 201–02 (Robert P. George ed., 1996).
242
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the domineering command of a sovereign lawmaker or, at best “a temporary aggregate of wills” unconstrained by “any rational discipline.” 243
Accordingly, these common lawyers worked to “interpret and stretch
statutory language” to make it congruent with the common law even
while begrudging the supreme authority of Parliament. 244
As noted, others like Hale offered a more sophisticated and less skeptical treatment of legislation. 245 Yet even Hale might have thought courts
should not handle statutes much more rigidly than precedents. On one
reading, he thought that statutes “initially ha[ve] [a] greater claim than
precedent to treatment as valid law,” but that over time incorporating
legislation into the common law mattered more than the fact that the
statute passed through the “formal rules of authorized law-making.” 246
Like precedents, courts would smooth the rough edges of statutes, reading them narrowly if they conflicted with the body of law as a whole and
invoking them more frequently if they were consonant with that broader
corpus juris. 247 If the common law courts “refus[ed] to ‘receive’ the legislation as law of the land,” a statute could remain formally valid but legally inert. 248
This antiformalist rendition of Hale is not unassailable. His discussions of legislation, and thus historical reconstructions of this treatment,
often focus on statutes whose original texts were lost to history and survive only in the practice of the courts. 249 Hale regards such lost legislation as “unwritten law” that is incorporated in common law fashion.
Hale’s discussion of statutes as a “Constituent” element of the common
law focuses on legislation believed to be “made before Time of

243
Postema II, supra note 8, at 18; see also id. at 18–19 (citing work of William Blackstone, Thomas Hedley, and Edward Coke as exemplifying this attitude).
244
Id. at 19.
245
See Postema, Bentham, supra note 130, at 19 (“In Hale we find a more consistent, and
indeed richer and more suggestive, treatment of the relationship between enacted and Common Law.”).
246
Postema II, supra note 8, at 20 (emphasis added).
247
See id. (citing Hale, supra note 116, at 46).
248
Postema, Bentham, supra note 130, at 24.
249
See Hale, supra note 116, at 4–6 (discussing acts of Parliament “before Time of
Memory; whereof . . . we have no Authentical Records”); id. at 39–45 (discussing the lack of
historical record of early statutes that have subsequently been incorporated as common law);
Postema, Bentham, supra note 130, at 24 (citing Hale, supra note 116, at 4).
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Memory.” 250 It is not clear that similar treatment should follow for extant authoritative texts. 251 Indeed, one can find early examples of common law judges identifying legislative intent with original public meaning and even seeking the aid of grammarians in statutory
interpretation. 252
Nevertheless, the classical common lawyers’ approach to legislation
often resembled modern arguments that judges can update or reinterpret
outmoded statutes in light of contemporary public values. For this reason, today’s nonformalists understandably trace their lineage back to
that tradition. Less appreciated are breaks between contemporary antiformalism and its ancestors when we consider the artificial reason of
classical common law theory. Similarly neglected are continuities between classical common law theory and formalist approaches to interpretation. This other side of the story suggests formalist implications of
the fact that legislatures are increasingly the locus of artificial reason in
a common law system.
B. Aspirations for Coherence
One point of continuity between modern statutory formalism and the
common law tradition is a limited aspiration for systemic legal coherence. Classical common lawyers’ pragmatic, incremental approach to
case law led them to often accept “categories that may appear, from a
more global perspective, to be unsupported by good reason” 253 or a legal
regime that “from a more theoretical perspective, might have appeared
to be a lack of systemic coherence.” 254 They accepted such rough corners because more ambitious aspirations encouraged disagreement more
than normative convergence. Our constitutional system of legislation also proceeds in a similar fashion, producing reactive, nonsystemic statutes that reflect supermajoritarian compromise, not the work of a single

250

Hale, supra note 116, at 44–45. Were it not for Hale’s other statement that the “Common Law” refers “most truly” to the shared law of the land, id. at 37, one could infer that he
understands legislation to be an entirely different category of law.
251
See Postema, Bentham, supra note 130, at 25 n.52 (raising the possibility that “Hale’s
view here may be that statutory rules remain valid only as long as the constitutional rules
empowering the parliamentary body to create them remain in force”).
252
See Hamburger, supra note 160, at 53 n.53 (citing Y.B. 35 Henry 6, pl. 25, fol. 16b
(1456) (Eng.); Hill v. Good, (1673) 89 Eng. Rep. 120 (C.P.); 1 Freeman 167).
253
Postema, Law’s System, supra note 179, at 97.
254
Postema II, supra note 8, at 5.
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visionary or cadre of like-minded leaders. The “artificial reason” of legislation parallels the classical common lawyer’s treatment of case law.
In this respect, Ronald Dworkin’s approach to statutes departs from
the common law tradition. His method is but a slightly modified version
of his theory of common law adjudication. 255 His theory seeks to make
the law the best it can be, weaving as tightly as possible an individual
piece of legislation into a broader, coherent web of principle. 256 The aspirations toward coherence in his approach are strong and farreaching. 257 Statutes are not to be read “as negotiated compromises” limited to “the text of the statute,” but rather are to be understood as “flowing
from the community’s present commitment to a background scheme of
political morality” that animates the law as a whole. 258 As statutes age,
the best interpretation integrates legislation with subsequent developments in case law, further statutes, and changes in public values.259
Dworkin thus praises the Supreme Court’s antiformalist approach to the
Civil Rights Act in United Steelworkers v. Weber, while criticizing its
formalist interpretation of the Endangered Species Act in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill. 260
Even if there were no significant difference between precedent and
enacted legislation, classical common lawyers would view the interpretive method of Dworkin’s Hercules to be Icarian in its pursuit of systematic coherence. 261 Guido Calabresi’s vision of the judicial role is more
255

See supra Subsection II.A.2.
Dworkin, supra note 28, at 338 (noting that the court should aspire to find “some justification that fits and flows through [the] statute and is, if possible, consistent with other legislation in force”); Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 283 (1978) (emphasizing how
courts should decide which argument is most coherent with the normatively best theory of
the law).
257
See Levenbook, supra note 181, at 356 (stating that in Dworkin’s view, “coherence is a
property of an entire system of law, and that the legally justified judicial decision, at least in
a hard case, is one that strengthens this systemic coherence or itself coheres best with the
coherent system”).
258
Dworkin, supra note 28, at 345–46; see Dworkin, Civil Rights, supra note 224, at 327–
29 (positing the “coherence theory” of statutory interpretation that “supposes that a statute
should be interpreted to advance the policies or principals that furnish the best political justification for the statute”).
259
See Dworkin, supra note 28, at 348–50.
260
See Dworkin, Civil Rights, supra note 224, at 327–30 (discussing United Steelworkers
v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979)); Dworkin, supra note 28, at 337–54 (discussing Tennessee
Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978)).
261
See 2 Ovid’s Metamorphoses, bk. VIII, at 347 (Brookes More trans., 1941) (“Proud of
his success, / The foolish Icarus forsook his guide, / And, in bold vanity, began to soar, / Rising upon his wings to touch the skies.”).
256
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modest, but coherence also plays a strong role in his argument for courts
to modify or decline to apply obsolete statutes. The targets for updating
are statutes “sufficiently out of phase with the whole legal framework.” 262 The courts can fairly demand “consistency” among “policies”
and “principles” in the legislative regime by depriving such “inconsistent” statutes of their presumptive validity. 263 Similarly, Peter Strauss
endorses Justice Stone’s claim that a common law judge ought to pursue
“the ideal of a unified system of judge-made and statute law woven into
a seamless whole.” 264
Strong versions of legal-process purposivism also promote broader
coherence over formal adherence to text or original intent. Hart and
Sacks explain that the most important task in interpretation is identifying
what “purpose ought to be attributed to the statute.” 265 The interpreter
ought to “harmonize” legislation with “more general principles and policies.” 266 It is “invariable in the law and of immense importance” to treat
a statute’s purpose “as including not only an immediate purpose or
group of related purposes but a larger and subtler purpose as to how the
particular statute is to be fitted into the legal system as a whole.” 267
Overall, the interpreter should “strive to develop a coherent and reasoned pattern of applications related to the general purpose” 268 of the
statute and even demand clear legislative statements before identifying a
departure “from a generally prevailing principle or policy of the law.” 269
In so doing, the purposive approach “will be well calculated to serve the
ultimate purposes of law.” 270
262

Calabresi, supra note 1, at 164; see also id. at 107–08 (stating that a court may modify
both common law or statutory rules when “they do not fit the landscape” or when other legal
rules “move in the opposite direction”).
263
Id. at 165.
264
Strauss, The Common Law, supra note 7, at 238 (quoting Harlan Fiske Stone, The
Common Law in the United States, 50 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 12 (1936)). Eskridge is more skeptical of broad coherence, at least as adopted by Dworkin and the Legal Process. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation 148 (1994).
265
Hart & Sacks, supra note 65, at 1169.
266
Id. at 148; see also David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 921, 937 (1992) (situating the interpretive task “in a world where
common law and statutory law are woven together in a complex fabric defining a wide range
of rights and duties”).
267
Hart & Sacks, supra note 65, at 1377.
268
Id. at 1380.
269
Id. at 1377.
270
Id. at 1169 (emphasis added); see Duxbury, supra note 70, at 261 (identifying Hart and
Sacks’s focus on broad coherence).
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Consequently, when formal elements of a statute, like its semantic
meaning in context or the underlying intent of the enacting legislature,
do not cohere with the more general background purpose of the statute
or clash with the pattern of the broader legal regime, a purposive interpreter will prefer the coherent interpretation even if, as a formal matter,
the reading is one of substantial “verbal difficulty.” 271 Hart and Sacks
thus wrote approvingly of the decision Riggs v. Palmer, which, over a
dissent relying on “plain meaning,” 272 invoked background general law
principles to smooth the awkward textual corners of legislation. 273
The role that coherence plays in statutory interpretation is a key difference between formalists and nonformalists today. As textualist Professor John Manning has argued, purposivists presume that legislation is
a product of “relatively coherent policy objectives” even if Congress
does not always express them clearly. 274 Coherence also plays a central
role for dynamic interpreters like Dworkin and Calabresi, though they
are also interested in having the statute cohere with moral philosophy
and contemporary public values. 275 These nonformalist approaches share
a greater willingness to ascend from the particulars of legal formality
and to promote more general coherence.
The formalist, by contrast, does not presume that the policy aspirations underpinning any one statute are transparently coherent. 276 This is
because, as discussed above, a law that can gain the assent of two large
assemblies plus the President is likely to be the product of compromise,
which is often “complex, awkward, and even incoherent.” 277 Textualists
are more inclined to take reasonably clear but inelegant statutes as they
find them, rather than redirect them toward a reconstructed background
purpose; more formal intentionalists, in turn, will seek to understand

271

Hart & Sacks, supra note 65, at 1244.
22 N.E. 188, 191–92 (N.Y. 1889) (Gray, J., dissenting).
273
See id. at 189–91 (rejecting “plain meaning”); Hart & Sacks, supra note 65, at 89–91,
1376 (invoking favorably the Riggs majority).
274
Manning, supra note 217, at 2012.
275
See Calabresi, supra note 1, at 164 (courts should reconstruct statutes that are “out of
phase with the whole legal framework” or “do not conform with the fabric of the law” and
lack “current and clear majoritarian support”); Levenbook, supra note 181, at 366 (emphasizing the role coherence and morality play in Dworkin’s approach to interpretation).
276
Manning, supra note 217, at 2010 (“Justice Scalia’s vision of Congress thus presumes
that it is quite deliberate in statutory expression, but (understandably) quite messy in the substantive policies it adopts.”).
277
Id.
272
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original intent at low levels of abstraction. 278 What a formalist would say
about individual statutes applies a fortiori to the demand for coherence
across the legal system as a whole, which consists of numerous statutes
passed over many years, an elaborate corpus of constitutional law, and
manifold maxims and principles of general law.
This is not to say that formalists reject coherence out of hand. Many
will seek broader coherence when statutes are vague or ambiguous. 279 Of
prominent academic formalists, only Adrian Vermeule rejects even a
modest search for interpretive coherence—and he does not purport to
describe the work of formalist jurists. 280 The difference between most
formalists and their opponents, then, concerns how far and wide courts
should search for coherence, and whether coherence should override a
meaning or intention that is reasonably clear in local context. Statutory
formalists, more than their rivals, resemble classical common lawyers
who regarded broad legal coherence as salutary when feasible or helpful,
but too costly to pursue with regularity as an overriding aim. Formalists
may or may not be wise to allow legislation to remain more “a muddle
than a system,” but in doing so they are not obviously unfaithful to the
common law tradition. 281 Rather, they appear to be extending it to legislation.
C. The Character and Place of Artificial Reason
This discussion of coherence focuses on one aspect of a larger issue:
the relationship between the artificial reason of the courts and the artificial reason of legislatures. A classical common law critique of the dynamic interpreter’s quest for broad statutory coherence is twofold. First,
nonformalism departs from the style of reasoning that common law
courts used when adjudicating disputes. Second, it does not respect the
278

See Manning, supra note 79, at 1288 (textualism); Ekins, supra note 99, at 250–51 (intentionalism). See generally John David Ohlendorff, Against Coherence in Statutory Interpretation, 90 Notre Dame L. Rev. 735, 738 (2014) (“[T]he coherence ideal fails to justify the
courts’ departure from their presumptive duty to faithfully carry out Congress’s will.”).
279
See W. Va. Univ. Hosp. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 101 (1991) (Scalia, J.) (“[I]t is our role
to make sense rather than nonsense out of the corpus juris.”); Ekins, supra note 99, at 259–
60.
280
See Adrian Vermeule, Judging Under Uncertainty: An Institutional Theory of Legal
Interpretation 4 (2006) (“[J]udges should sharply limit their interpretive ambitions, in part by
limiting themselves to a small set of interpretive sources and a restricted range of relatively
wooden decision-rules.”).
281
Simpson, supra note 160, at 24 (describing judicial common law in these terms).
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distinct reasoning of the legislatures that develop statutes in common
law fashion. Both arguments complicate the neat story linking nonformal statutory interpretation with the common law against statutory formalism. This Subsection elaborates these common law critiques of nonformal interpretation.
1. The Character of Artificial Reason
Classical common lawyers frequently distinguished between the “artificial reason” of the law and the untutored natural reason of kings and
philosophers. Many antiformalists, while claiming the mantle of the
common law, depart from this distinction when describing the judicial
creativity involved in statutory interpretation. Dworkin viewed judges as
the princes of law’s empire, “but not its seers and prophets.” 282 That task
fell to moral “philosophers, if they are willing, to work out law’s ambitions for itself, the purer form of law within and beyond the law we
have.” 283 Classical common lawyers, however, saw “Casuists, Schoolmen, [and] Morall Philosophers” as the worst candidates for expositors
of the common law. 284 One of the greatest challenges to classical common law thought was “conceptual,” coming from those who “took an
academic perspective on law” and thus had a “low view of national custom and high expectations for reframing it within academic generalizations.” 285
For traditional common lawyers, the natural law—or “political morality” in Dworkin’s argot—may have justified the institution of law on a
systemic level, but was too indeterminate on particulars to offer reliable
guidance in individual cases and doctrines. 286 Accordingly, classical
common lawyers facing a hard case were more likely to go back and dig
down to the cases to find the “common reason” of the dispute rather than
appeal upward to the moral law. 287 To the common law mind, reworking
the law today in the image of Rawlsian equality is no more useful or

282

Dworkin, supra note 28, at 407.
Id.
284
Holdsworth, supra note 157, at 503.
285
Hamburger, supra note 160, at 116.
286
See Postema I, supra note 111, at 177 (stating that natural law played a “deeply subterranean” role in classical common law theory).
287
See id. at 178–79 (noting that, in hard cases, “the tendency of the common lawyer was
not to consult universal moral sources . . . but rather to look longer, harder, and deeper into
the accumulated fund of experience and example provided by the common law”).
283
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prudent than invoking Aquinas in 1600 to resolve the details of property
law. 288
The more realist dynamic theories would also be alien to classical
common lawyers. Judge Calabresi, for example, stipulates that judges
“make law in a democracy,” citing the work of California Supreme
Court Judge Roger Traynor, whose work in common law and statutory
interpretation understands utilitarian policy balancing as central to judicial decision making. 289 Chief Judge Kaye, who invokes her state court’s
common law heritage to reject statutory formalism, takes a similarly realist tack. 290 Earlier, seminal essays by Justice Stone and James Landis
that draw on the common law to support dynamic interpretation are also
skeptical of the classical account of artificial reason. 291
For classical common lawyers, appealing to the judge’s understanding
of natural law or justice to fill gaps in the common law or redirect its
course does not capture the practice of artificial reason. Ironically, the
natural law of a Dworkin and the realism of a Traynor both draw pictures of legal reasoning similar to the common law’s early archrivals.
For critics like Hobbes and Bentham, once you dig beneath the encrustation of doctrine and precedents, the common law’s core is simply the
judge’s natural reasoning about justice and right, including moral reasons to sometimes follow morally imperfect doctrine and precedent.

288
On this point, Aquinas would agree with the common lawyer, for he saw that on many
questions the natural law permitted a range of judgment and local variation. See Finnis, supra note 242, at 202–03.
289
Calabresi, supra note 1, at 92 n.1 (citing Roger Traynor, Statutes Revolving in Common Law Orbits, 17 Cath. U. L. Rev. 401 (1968)). Professor Strauss also states that common
law courts, like Congress, “make law,” though he puts scare quotes around the phrase and
hedges skepticism about the classical account. See Strauss, The Common Law, supra note 7,
at 253; see also Roger Traynor, Reasoning in a Circle of Law, 56 Va. L. Rev. 739, 751
(1970) (characterizing judging as “the recurring choice of one policy over another”).
290
Kaye, supra note 3, at 11 (“[S]tate courts effectively ‘make law,’ and do so by reference
to social policy, not only when deciding traditionally common-law cases but also when faced
with cases that involve difficult questions of constitutional and statutory interpretation.”).
291
See James McCauley Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, in Harvard Legal Essays
213, 217 (Roscoe Pound ed., 1934) (dismissing as “abstract rationalism” the notion that
common law courts “merely ‘find’ law”); Stone, supra note 264, at 10 (noting that a common law judge is “often engaged not so much in extracting a rule of law from the precedents,
as we were once accustomed to believe, as in making an appraisal and comparison of social
values” and “weigh[ing] competing demands of social advantage, not unmindful that continuity and symmetry of the law are themselves such advantages”).
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There is nothing more to see besides philosophy or policy once you
“pluck[] off the mask of mystery.” 292
Whether or not antiformalists are correct to doubt the classical common lawyer’s belief in the relative autonomy of legal reason, their skepticism complicates any straightforward argument that the common law
justifies dynamic statutory interpretation. Recall the antiformalist’s
claim that the common law empowers judicial interpreters to depart
from the prescriptions embodied in historical legislative text or intent. A
reinterpretation of common law adjudication as a form of coherentist
natural law, in the style of Ronald Dworkin, requires a trust in judicial
wisdom to discover moral consensus as romantic as the classical common lawyer’s belief in the autonomy and reliability of artificial reason.
A more realist understanding of common law as policy balancing, when
invoked to modify legislative norms, creates separation-of-powers worries more pressing than if artificial reason were a medium that could
channel general customary consensus. This is not to say that deploying a
newly theorized common law in the old ways is impossible, though I
have doubts about whether one can do so without anachronism. It is to
emphasize, however, that notwithstanding any rhetoric of continuity,
statutory antiformalism’s relationship with the inherited common law
tradition is marked by as much change as constancy.
2. The Place of Artificial Reason
Nevertheless, modern antiformalist understandings of the common
law’s artificial reason are not always sharp departures from the tradition.
Judge Calabresi also appeals to craft traits like developing the common
law in incremental fashion, reasoning by analogy and from principles
implicit in precedent, and treating like cases alike. 293 His placement of
statutes in the center of a common law system also reflects Matthew
Hale’s approach. He, too, rejects the notion that “only judges could discern” the legal fabric “and that changes in it could happen only through

292
Postema, Bentham, supra note 130, at 263. Antiformalists are not alone in this skepticism. See James B. Beam Distillery Corp. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 549 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (“I am not so naive (nor do I think our forebears were) as to be unaware that
judges in a real sense ‘make’ law. But they make it as judges make it, which is to say as
though they were ‘finding’ it—discerning what the law is . . . .”); Nelson, Legitimacy, supra
note 77, at 57.
293
Calabresi, supra note 1, at 96–97, 101, 108–09.
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accretion of judicial reaction to changed conditions.” 294 Most importantly, Calabresi sees the common law as channeling and reflecting “underlying popular attitudes.” 295 To him, the common law seeks to reflect the
ways and norms of people subject to it, and he also understands legislation by assembly as operating in a similar fashion. He explains that, with
legislation, “as with common lawmaking, the assumption that the result
reflects an underlying majoritarianism and hence is legitimate in a democracy seems a sensible one.” 296 Legislation and judicial decisions are
both integral to a common law system of ascending customary law; they
are two different “modes of existence” of the same legal substance. 297
For Calabresi, the judge has the dynamic and necessary role of integrating these sources of law, which may include extending the reach of a
statute to modify background common law or refusing to apply a statute
perceived to be out of phase with the broader fabric of the law and popular values (of which the broader fabric of law is important evidence). In
this respect, his theory meshes with the broader understanding of a
common law system discussed above; it is formalism’s refusal to dynamically integrate legislation with the broader fabric of the law and
popular values that seems out of phase with the tradition.
The objection to this argument is that it fails to grasp the implications
of the legislative process as a form of artificial reason. The structured,
compromise-forcing nature of the legislative process draws on the wisdom and views of a wide array of the polity and forces their representatives to forge the closest approximation to consensus that a complex society can muster. Such reasoning is beyond the capacity of any
individual alone, including the common law judge. From this perspective, the common law jurists’ attempts to capture and synthesize the custom of the realm through disciplined legal argument is an inferior version of the artificial, common reason of the legislative process. Just as
the classical common lawyer understood the untutored reason of the
king and the philosopher to lack the capacity of the artificial reason of
the law, now it is common law judges who must understand that their
capacities to identify shared, fitting legal solutions to practical problems
are outstripped by the superior artificial reason of the legislative process.

294

Id. at 98.
Id.
296
Id. at 109 (emphasis added).
297
Postema II, supra note 8, at 19.
295
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The implications of this insight can point toward formalism. The dynamic theorist updating an obsolete or awkwardly drafted statute, or extending the formal scope of a statute to capture the spirit of the age, puts
herself in the position of not only a legislator, but a legislature, whose
translation of public views and practices into concrete norms she cannot
replicate. The same holds for a strong purposivist who overrides legislative formality in favor of an imaginative reconstruction of a legislature’s
treatment of a dispute. Finally, the antiformalist’s impatience with the
slow pace, multiple veto-gates, and scarce agenda time of the legislative
process appears not so much as interbranch cooperation, but rather a rejection of the common law tradition’s demand for broad consensus behind legal rules.
The formalist—who adheres to reasonably clear text even if it is substantively awkward, or who respects historical legislative intent understood at a low level of generality—is more faithful to the artificial reason of the legislative process in its actions and inaction. The formalist’s
assumption that “the precise contours of legislative policy may reflect
the procedural sequence of legislative events rather than a frictionless
implementation of coherent policy impulses,” is neither alien to the
common law tradition nor a commitment to the irrationality of apparently awkward legislation. 298 Just as Henry Sumner Maine observed how
the “substantive law” of early common law appeared to be “gradually
secreted in the interstices of procedure,” the substantive law of common
law statutes is shaped by legislative procedures that channel collective
wisdom and disagreement into a rough, pragmatic consensus from the
ground up. 299 To defer to the output, when readily discernible, is to respect the irreplicable process that legitimizes statutes in ascending governance. 300 By the same token, deference to the legislature’s conclusions
298
Manning, supra note 217, at 2031; see also Manning, supra note 208, at 424 (“[The legislative process] conditions [Congress’s] ability to translate raw policy impulses or intentions
into finished legislation. For them, intended meaning never emerges unfiltered; it must survive a process that includes committee approval, logrolling, the need for floor time, threatened filibusters, conference committees, veto threats, and the like.”).
299
Henry Summer Maine, Dissertations on the Early Law and Custom 389 (Henry Holt &
Co., New York 1883) (“[Early English] substantive law has at first the look of being gradually secreted in the insterstices of procedure.”); cf. S.F.C. Milsom, Historical Foundations of
the Common Law 59 (2d ed. 1981) (“There was no substantive law to which pleading was
adjective. These were the terms in which the law existed and in which lawyers thought.”).
300
See Easterbrook, Original Intent, supra note 85, at 63 (“To use an algebraic metaphor,
law is like a vector. It has length as well as direction . . . . To find length we must take account of objectives, of means chosen, and of stopping points identified.”); Manning, supra
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echoes the early common law practice of leaving the determination of
“substantive norms of behaviour and liability” to the jury as the voice of
the community, while leaving to judges questions of “formal law,”
which were primarily procedural. 301 The common law was a “joint creation of the ‘reasonable men’ of the sworn neighborhood assembly and
the professional judges” 302 and then, as now, it is reasonable to assign
the broader community primary input on substantive norms.
As with coherence, statutory formalists do not reject any repair to legislative purpose or principle, but rather treat it as a tool to resolve ambiguity and vagueness, not to override what they see as reasonably clear,
formal manifestations of Congress’s expressed meaning or intent. 303 A
similar story follows for the use of legislative history, though some formalists continue to resist its use even in unclear interpretive questions
cases. 304
D. Publicity and Formality
A final aspect for comparison is the publicity of the common law. As
Postema explains, the common law sought to offer a “theoretically untidy, but practically accessible and widely and publicly intelligible,
framework for legal reasoning.” 305 The twin demands that rules must not
only “make practical sense,” but also be matters of “public accessibility
and with it effective public accountability” 306 raise the familiar tradeoff
between rules and standards. The more an interpreter adjusts a rule to
ensure individual applications make sense, the less publicly accessible
the rule is as a practical matter. This dilemma between clear guidance

note 79, at 1310 (“[S]tatutes reflect choices about means as well as ends, and the chosen
means reflect the price that the legislature was willing to pay in order to achieve the desired
ends.”).
301
Postema I, supra note 111, at 163.
302
Donald Kelley, The Human Measure: Social Thought in the Western Legal Tradition,
166 (1990).
303
See Pojanowski, supra note 7, at 484–85.
304
See Manning, supra note 79, at 1308–09 (noting the diminishing importance of the legislative history debate and a settled “equilibrium” where the center of the Court is willing to
consider legislative history in cases of ambiguity or vagueness); Elliott M. Davis, Note, The
Newer Textualism: Justice Alito’s Statutory Interpretation, 30 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 983,
985–987 (2007) (comparing Justice Alito’s openness to legislative history with Justice Scalia’s opposition).
305
Postema, Law’s System, supra note 179, at 28.
306
Id. at 27–28.
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and substantive rationality is a central problem of law generally, so it is
unsurprising to find the common law grappling with it in particular. 307
Much common law theory favors a standard-like approach to law.
Brian Simpson noted the emergence of a “school-rules concept” of
common law that reconceives the corpus juris as a binding code laid
down by judges, but he saw that development as a sign of the tradition’s
deterioration. 308 In the received tradition, he maintains, no form of words
can capture the common law in rule-like fashion, and there is no bright
line between saying something is the law and saying that it is just and
rational. 309 Statutory nonformalists emphasize this aspiration for substantive rationality in the common law. Dynamically updating obsolete
statutes pursues this goal, as does broadening or narrowing the scope of
a statute to promote its purpose. Public accessibility, from this perspective, is intertwined with law’s substantive rationality, for legislation and
interpretations that jar common sensibilities do not offer reliable guidance; people will either not understand the law or not take it seriously.
But, again, this is only one side of the story. While Hale found it crucial that the common law be congruent with the practices and views of
the polity, his defense of the common law against Hobbes also explained
that it is better “to preferre a Law by which a Kingdome hath [long]
been happily governed” than to risk that peace by preferring “[s]ome
new Theory” grounded in his own sense of reasonableness. 310 Therefore,
though “a certaine and determinate Law may have some mischiefes,”
especially in individual cases, they are “preferable before that Arbitrary
and uncertaine rule which Men miscall the Law of reason.” 311 Unaided

307
Cf. Larry Alexander, The Gap, 14 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 695, 695 (1991) (describing
this “problem of rules” as “the heart of the problem of law”); Lon Fuller, Reason and Fiat in
Case Law, 59 Harv. L. Rev. 376, 377 (1946); see also Postema, Bentham, supra note 130, at
7 (“Coke seems to be saying, it is in the nature of the law be reasonable, but at the same time
the law . . . constitutes the standards by which the community judges the reasonableness or
unreasonableness of actions.”).
308
Simpson, supra note 160, at 12, 23.
309
Id. at 16 (“[T]he general position in the common law is that it lacks an authoritative authentic text.”); id. at 10. (“[N]o very clear distinction exists between saying that a particular
solution to a problem is in accordance with the law, and saying that it is the rational, or fair,
or just solution.”).
310
Holdsworth, supra note 157, at 504; see also Coke, I Institutes of the laws of England
§ 138, at 98 (London, William Rawlins, et al. 1629) (“No man (out of his private reason)
ought to be wiser than the law, which is the perfection of reason.”).
311
Holdsworth, supra note 157, at 503.
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natural reason risks “instability, uncertainty, and arbitrariness” 312 and it
lacks the legitimacy of common law rules and principles, which “are Institutions introduced by the will and Consent of others implicitely by
Custome and usage, or Explicitely by written Laws or Acts of Parliament.” 313 This preference for existing rules is more than the recognition
that it is sometimes more important for the law to be settled than settled
right. 314 It also stems from belief that the incremental development of
the law by many experienced minds engaged in the discipline of artificial reason will be a more reliable guide than an individual who perceives a rule to be irrational and sets to fix it on her own.
The statutory formalist, who chooses the objective meaning or particular historical intention over statutory purpose or contemporary public
values, follows the lead of Hale who, responding to Hobbes’s critique of
the obscurantism of common law doctrine, argued that “there is good
reason to accept the requirements of law as fully binding, even when the
rules cannot commend themselves to our reason.” 315 The statutory formalist would also applaud the common law theory of David Hume who,
building off Hale’s work, thought the “most important thing for society
is that lines of authority be absolutely clear, settled, and matters of
common knowledge.” 316
Classical common lawyers, not just nineteenth-century positivists,
valued public accessibility and accountability in legal development. This
dovetails with their preferences for “salience” over broad “moral vision”
in selecting the common law’s norms. 317 Shifting to statutes, this orientation chimes with Waldron’s argument that, absent focus on a canonical
text, reasoned deliberation by large groups is not possible. 318 Formality
is essential for bottom-up, customary legislation. Adherence to a statute’s reasonably clear semantic meaning or publicly discernible original
intention takes common law legislation on its own terms, even when do-

312

Berman, Origins, supra note 153, at 1716.
Holdsworth, supra note 157, at 505.
314
See Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Randy J. Kozel, Settled Versus Right: Constitutional Method and the Path of Precedent,
91 Tex. L. Rev. 1843, 1855–63 (2013) (discussing the costs and benefits of legal continuity).
315
Postema, Bentham, supra note 130, at 77 (characterizing Hale’s response to Hobbes).
316
Id. at 90 (characterizing Hume’s theory and linking it to Hale’s); see id. at 110–43 (describing Hume’s formalist, ascending, and conventionalist theory of common law while distinguishing it from Hobbes’s legal theory emphasizing rules dictated by a sovereign).
317
See Postema II, supra note 8, at 10.
318
See Waldron, Law and Disagreement, supra note 133, at 80–82.
313
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ing so is in tension with background purpose, policy, or contemporary
values. 319 Not only does formalism respect the work of publicly accountable lawmakers, 320 it focuses on indicia that are publicly salient
and accessible in a way that abstract purposes, imaginative reconstructions, strands of legislative history, or judicial interpretation of contemporary public values are often not.
Accordingly, the common law tradition not only embraces Riggs v.
Palmer, which Dworkin celebrated in 1986 for its use of legal principles
to trump the plain text of a wills statute, but also Lord Camden’s 1765
opinion in Doe v. Kersey. There, Lord Camden counseled adherence to
the Statute of Frauds’ explicit requirement of three witnesses for a valid
will, even when the rule creates an injustice in an individual case. 321
Lord Camden recognized that the rules of “positive law” can be blunt,
but that is nevertheless preferable “to leave the Rule inflexible than
permit it to be bent by the Discretion of the Judge.” 322 Such modification
of statutory formality, Camden asserted, is for “the Judgment of the Legislature.” 323 The opinion in Doe, fittingly, is a rebuke of Lord Mansfield,
the dynamic jurist Dworkin echoes in his vision of the common law
working itself (and inferior statutes) pure. 324 Although Lord Camden’s
opinion was a dissent, his opinion does not occupy a fringe of the common law tradition. 325

319

Cf. Manning, supra note 278, at 1290.
The final draft of the statutory text was accessible to all legislative actors, the focus of
their debate, and the object they chose to enact together. Even if (when) members of legislature fail to read the final text, the legislature and the legislators are answerable for its content. See Ekins, supra note 99, at 234, 271–72.
321
See Hamburger, supra note 160, at 145 (discussing Doe).
322
Id.
323
Id.
324
Compare Dworkin, supra note 28, at 400 (invoking “the impure, present law gradually
transforming itself into its own purer ambition”), with Omychund v. Barker, 26 Eng. Rep. 15
(Ch.) 23 (1744) (Mansfield, L.J.) (“[A] statute very seldom can take in all cases, therefore
the common law, that works itself pure by rules drawn from the fountain of justice, is for this
reason superior to an act of parliament.”); see James Oldham, English Common Law in the
Age of Mansfield 359 (2004) (describing Camden’s Doe opinion as an “attack on Mansfield’s” expansive views of judicial discretion).
325
Professor Schauer has scoured the law reports for cases in which, like Riggs v. Palmer,
the letter of the law allows wrongdoers to profit from a will. He found that, “pace Dworkin,”
Riggs appears to be an exception to a general rule of undesirable actors inheriting pursuant to
the letter of wills statutes. See Frederick Schauer, The Limited Domain of Law, 90 Va. L.
Rev. 1909, 1937–38 (2004) (citing cases).
320
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This is not to say that the common law tradition only points toward
formality. There was a “deep ambiguity in Common Law theory” about
whether the common law set public standards of reason and justice or
was instead the “working out of reason” itself into the law. 326 This ambiguity indicates that those who invoke the common law to justify nonformal interpretation draw on a selective view of the tradition. The formalist’s solicitude toward publicly accessible, procedurally settled
norms would not be mysterious to classical common lawyers. The Supreme Court’s current tendency to prefer formality, to rarely invoke the
absurdity doctrine, but to not categorically foreswear such substantive
overrides in extremis, represents a rough and, predictably, messy accommodation of those competing values. 327
In this respect, disagreement between formalists and antiformalists in
statutory interpretation concerns this unresolved tension at the heart of
the common law itself. A claim that this longstanding dilemma is simply
a choice between an antiformalist “common law model of statutory interpretation” 328 and a formalist approach where judges are “mere servitors of a positivistic sovereign” 329 does not grasp the complexity of the
common law tradition or all the interpretive implications of bottom-up,
customary legislation.
V. REALIGNMENT WITHIN A COMMON LAW SYSTEM
A common law system consists not only of precedent, but also legislation developed in a manner analogous to the artificial reason of judicial decision making. Precedential and statutory common law both aim
to capture, or forge, bottom-up consensus on particular public problems.
In the common law tradition, equating the process for developing these
legal norms with any one decision-maker’s view on natural law, policy,
or popular opinion is not only misleading, but corrosive of the practice
and its benefits.

326

Postema, Bentham, supra note 130, at 37.
See Pojanowski, supra note 7, at 485–86 (describing the Court’s formalist turn in recent
decades); cf. Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2090–91 (2014) (giving, “in this curious case,” legislation a narrower interpretation when an otherwise-ordinary reading would
conflict with background principles of federalism).
328
Pildes, supra note 73, at 913.
329
Id. at 898.
327
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So far, a dynamic interpreter could agree with much in the paragraph
above (though not each one would 330). What divides formalism and dynamic rivals is the common law court’s role when a statute’s reasonably
clear formal indicia point against background purpose, the broader fabric
of the law, sound justice or policy, or contemporary values. The dynamic interpreter, relying on the common law character of adjudication and
legislation, treats interpretation as a dialogue in which the court may imprint its artificial reason on the legal materials at hand. Just as courts refine precedent over time, they can also develop statutes, with the caveat
that the legislature may override such judicial refinement in response.
The standard formalist response grounds faithful agency on a sharp
distinction between common law adjudication and statutory interpretation. The common law tradition is relevant, if at all, in the absence of
legislation or as a tool for interpreting unclear statutes. One payoff of the
discussion so far is recognizing how an interpreter can be a formalist
without, in the words of dynamic critics, “resegregat[ing] the worlds of
statute and common law” 331 at the level of theory. Interpretive formalism
can be understood as an extension of the common law tradition in its respect for compromise, modest aspirations for coherence, and its preference for normative salience over abstract moral vision. At the root of
these features is a willingness to defer without further elaboration to the
legislature’s artificial reason when formal indicia are reasonably clear.
Such effacement of the judicial role in these cases is not necessarily
grounded in a rejection of the common law tradition, but an interpretation of that tradition in which primacy—though not exclusivity—in developing common law shifts from courts to legislatures. This final Part
explores some implications of a common law theory of faithful agency.
A. What Interpretive Formalism Offers the Common Law Tradition
The common law, like any living tradition, must develop as it seeks to
resolve problems that confront it. 332 The understanding of the legislative
process articulated above, however stylized, suggests that the common
law tradition continues even as the center of gravity of legal develop-

330
See supra Subsection IV.C.1. (describing nonformalists’ breaks with the classical
common law tradition’s understanding of artificial reason).
331
Strauss, Resegregating, supra note 54, at 528.
332
Cf. Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? 349–69 (1988) (describing
the rationality and development of traditions of thought).
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ment shifts initiative to legislatures. It is possible to understand the shift
of primacy from courts to legislatures—and the concomitant judicial
deference to reasonably clear statutory formality—as a natural development in the common law tradition, not a rupture.
This emphasis on the work of the people’s representatives for the development of the law continues the arc of increasing populism in the
common law tradition’s conception of law as bottom-up custom suited
to the complexion and ways of a polity. 333 Rather than channeling that
populism through direct referenda or pure majoritarian politics, the tradition disciplines that deliberation through formal structures encouraging
compromise, if not widespread consensus.
Relatedly, this development mitigates the persistent dilemma about
how to connect the arcana of common law doctrine with the lived ways
of the people. Put another way, it responds to the question of how the
custom of the bar corresponds with the custom of the people. 334 Classical common lawyers bridged this gap by arguing that the technical doctrine had “substantial congruence . . . with the ways of the people” or
was incorporated and accommodated “to the ‘frame’ and ‘disposition’ of
the people.” 335 The classical position primarily assigned the task of such
incorporation and accommodation to an experienced and prudent judiciary. 336 In line with the increasing populism of common law as ascending
custom, however, the “artificial reason” of the legislative process can
better narrow the gap between positive law and the people on whose behalf it speaks. In fact, it was Hale’s recognition that the common law
had to be “accommodated to the Conditions, Exigencies and Conveniencies of the People” that led him to underline the importance of statutes in the legal system. 337
333

See Cromartie, supra note 150, at 206–14 (describing the increasing populism of common law theory).
334
See David J. Bederman, Custom as a Source of Law 30 (2010) (contrasting common
law understood as “custom of the courts” with the vision of the common law as “populist
and deeply rooted in practices of the English people-at-large”); Cromartie, supra note 150, at
211 (observing the problem of connecting custom of the courts to popular practice and beliefs); Postema I, supra note 111, at 168–69 (same).
335
Postema I, supra note 111, at 175 (quoting Hale, supra note 116, at 51); see also id.
(discussing St. Germain’s approach).
336
Id. at 175.
337
Hale, supra note 116, at 39; see Berman, Origins, supra note 153, at 1712 (drawing this
connection); cf. Bederman, supra note 334, at 30 (describing Hale as a common-law populist
who also accepted “parliamentary supremacy” over “judge-made common law and customary regimes”).
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The shift of emphasis toward statutes also mitigates the problems of
complexity that bedevil a common law system limited to adjudication. It
is one thing for courts to resolve disputes over contracts or slip-and-falls,
and quite another for them to tackle larger, polycentric tasks like access
to health care, utility regulation, or interstate pollution. 338 Appreciating
legislatures’ potential for systemic reform is no modern revelation. Hale
saw legislation as crucial to legal development, chaired a law reform
commission, and called for incremental legislative alteration of the
common law (while cautioning against departing from basic constitutional norms). 339 As with increasingly popular responsibility for artificial
reason in the common law style, a greater emphasis on statutory initiative to resolve complex problems (in admittedly incremental fashion)
extends and develops the common law tradition, rather than abandoning
it. In this light, the major differences between legislating and adjudication noted at the end of Part III point toward judicial deference. 340 The
wider range of considerations for compromise available to a legislature,
as well as the broader array of solutions—including deferring decision
or even delegation—are commensurate to the complexity of modern
governance. Courts’ more limited tools to respond to that complexity
further show the superiority of legislatures as “artificial reasoners.”
Finally, a common law system’s increased turn toward legislation
may be a result of, or response to, the erosion of the social consensus
and cohesion that characterized the more juriscentric common law of the
classical period. Even forty years ago, legal historian Brian Simpson saw
such fragmentation afoot as the scope of the legal system broadened beyond “twelve men in scarlet” cultivating the common law. 341 Other ex338
See Lon Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, in The Principles of Social Order, Selected Essays of Lon L. Fuller 86, 111–21 (Kenneth I. Winston ed., 1981) (discussing
the limits of adjudication to resolve such polycentric problems); see generally Frederick
Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 883, 883–85 (2006) (exploring the
limits of case-by-case litigation for law development).
339
Berman, Origins, supra note 153, at 1712 (stating that Hale appreciated “the importance
of legislation under Edward I . . . who was in many ways the hero of Hale’s History and,
more generally, to stress the great role played by legislation throughout English legal history”); Gray, supra note 116, at xxix (“But for Hale the basic changes of the crucial medieval
centuries pointed to conscious general legislation.”); id. at xxix–xxx (discussing Hale’s work
as a reformer and Hale’s essay “The Amendment of the Laws’).
340
See supra Section III.C.
341
Simpson, supra note 160, at 24; see id. (surmising that the “breakdown in the cohesion
of the common law” system is connected to “the institutional changes of the nineteenth century, and the progressive increase in [its] scale of operations”).
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planations, such as increased pluralism in society and the bar, also come
to mind. One manifestation of this breakdown in consensus, which
Simpson saw occurring in America well before England, was a tendency
to identify common law doctrine with canonical rules that satisfy external tests of validity, rather than internal shared agreement among practitioners. 342 Simpson, who focused on the judiciary and attempted to render its practice more rule-like, saw in these developments a “breakdown
of a system of customary or traditional law.” 343
A focus on legislation sheds new, and perhaps more optimistic light,
on the challenge social fragmentation poses to the common law system.
Unlike common law adjudication, which appears to require a judiciary
reliably in touch with widespread social consensus, the structured, deliberative reasoning of large assemblies has greater potential to identify
preexisting agreement and to forge agreement through compromise
where there was none before. An increasing reliance on legislation in
common law fashion represents (optimistically) a successful adaptation
of the tradition to new social contexts or (resignedly) a second-best approximation of the tradition in an age of diminished expectations about
social agreement.
B. What the Common Law Tradition Offers Interpretive Formalism
It is fair to ask why interpretive formalists should claim the common
law tradition, especially if doing so will not change much about their
approach to statutory interpretation. This Section identifies some of the
benefits of retheorizing formalism within the common law tradition.
First, classical common law theory grounds interpretive formalism in
arguments that are continuous with the broader legal tradition from
which our legal system originated. This point is rhetorical, but rhetoric
in law is more than puffery. Law is an inherently conservative practice
that favors continuity over rupture and the familiar over the novel. Formalists begin arguments on the back foot when they concede or celebrate their break from those traditions. Such a disadvantage is unnecessary, as formalists can situate their practice within the inherited tradition
and can use that tradition to criticize rival approaches.
Second, interpretive formalism is a more complete theory of interpretation when integrated with the common law tradition. The primary divi342
343

See id. at 23–24.
Id. at 23.
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sion between formalists and their opponents is whether to follow reasonably clear text (or original intent) when it conflicts with background
purpose, the broader fabric of the law, or contemporary values. Yet formalists interpret unclear statutory provisions in light of uncodified purpose, other legislation, and background, unwritten legal principles and
policies in common law fashion. This has led critics to claim that formalist approaches like textualism are incomplete as theories of statutory
interpretation. 344 Textualism tells courts what to do with clear text, but
says little about the many cases in which legislation is not clear. A
common law theory that includes formalism, however, can gather frontline faithful agency and the second-line integrative, contextual approaches under the same tent. It is not “Austin first, open Blackstone in
case of emergency,” but the common law tradition all the way down.
Relatedly, common law formalism more readily reconciles faithful
agency in statutory interpretation with the persistence of background,
unwritten law. 345 Federal court decisions, including those written by
formalist judges, will find implied common law defenses to statutory
crimes, read terms in light of common law meanings, and resolve conflicts of law questions without appeal to statutory text. Federal courts in
a textualist era have begun to act as if the statute somehow “contained”
or incorporated these rules of unwritten law. 346 As Professor Caleb Nelson has argued, these practices could just as well be explained by interstitial general law that persists notwithstanding dicta doubting the
“brooding omnipresence” in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins. 347 Formalist
resistance to this solution, moreover, flows from a Hobbesian and Benthamite belief that common law is merely a judicial form of law as
command. 348
344

See Merrill, supra note 105, at 1596.
Cf. Nelson, Persistence, supra note 77, at 503 (defending “the continuing relevance of
rules of general law––rules whose content is not dictated entirely by any single decisionmaker (state or federal), but instead emerges from patterns followed in many different
jurisdictions”).
346
See Nelson, State and Federal Models, supra note 77, at 661–63.
347
Id. at 661–63, 724–28; S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J.)
(“The common law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky, but the articulate voice of
some sovereign or quasi sovereign that can be identified.”); see Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938) (adopting Holmes’s rejection of general federal law because there is
no “transcendental body of law outside any particular State but obligatory within it”).
348
See Nelson, Legitimacy, supra note 77, at 17 (“Bentham’s views certainly have modern
adherents. Textualists, in particular, have embraced various aspects of his critique of unwritten law.”).
345
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Once we reject this top-down understanding of precedent and statute
within a common law system, background unwritten law can more comfortably have a place alongside legislation in formalist statutory interpretation. Authoritative legislation is a superior form of customary law, for
sure, and trumps conflicting, uncodified doctrine. But if courts understand common law adjudication as less judicial fiat than a principled and
disciplined attempt to forge and channel customary norms, the separation-of-powers worries of judicial recognition of background law in the
“gaps” of statutes are less fraught. 349 Adjudication and legislation aspire
to the same end of ascending law; that statutes are superior evidence of
our common law does not necessarily extinguish background doctrine
consistent with the legislation. Nor does the courts’ justified use of this
background law require a belief—or a fiction—that Congress silently
commands that this doctrine to be somehow “within” the statute.
In a similar vein, situating formalism in the common law tradition also sheds light on the order of sources formalists prefer when interpreting
unclear statutes. Many will look to inferences from statutory structure,
other legislation, and interpretive canons before using legislative history,
abstract purpose, or sound policy to resolve statutory uncertainty. 350 The
formalist’s preference for coherence with the enacted corpus of legislation and well-established background legal norms, which critics decry as
willful resistance to the legislature, is more understandable if statutory
formalism is an extension of the common law tradition.
Reading a statutory provision in light of other enacted materials looks
to other authentic examples of the legislature’s “artificial reason.” Looking to established, uncodified background law draws on the legislatively
defeasible artificial reason of the courts. Given common lawyers’ distrust of “natural reason,” both resources are superior to filling a statutory
gap based on a judge’s views on justice or policy. Given the inaccessibility of the legislature’s reasoning to the judicial outsider, other existing, authentic results of the legislature’s reasoning process may be more
reliable sources than inference of legislative purpose, history, or contemporary values. Similarly, to the common lawyer the disciplined, artificial reason of the courts evident in interpretive canons or uncodified
349

See Pojanowski, supra note 22, at 1748–50.
See Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories for Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 Yale L.J. 1750, 1763, 1829–33
(2010) (identifying this feature of federal textualism and comparing it to state court “modified textualists” who prefer legislative history over non-linguistic canons).
350
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general law may be more effective in channeling custom than reading
the raw material of legislative debates. Thus, the formalist’s preference
for canons, presumptions, and uncodified background law over inferences of purpose, legislative history, or general sense of the spirit of the
age may be best explained by their continuing, if unacknowledged, adherence to the common law tradition.
Finally, the common law tradition bolsters, or at least contextualizes,
constitutional arguments many formalists use to justify their approach to
statutory interpretation. A leading strain of textualism, for example, aims
to derive formalist rules of interpretation from the Constitution. 351 Importantly, and unsurprisingly, these constitutional arguments have more
traction with judicial formalists than nondoctrinal rationales for formalist interpretation. 352 But such arguments are, by formalist standards,
more suggestive than conclusive. 353 Extracting principles that demand
textualism from the Constitution’s Vesting Clauses and the requirements
of bicameralism and presentment seems hardly more determinate than
deriving general “separation of powers” or “federalism” principles. Textualists like Manning have been hesitant to endorse the latter exercises,
which raise questions about such arguments in service of statutory formalism. 354

351

Compare Manning, supra note 96 (grounding formalism in constitutional structure),
with Larry Alexander, All or Nothing At All? The Intentions of Authorities and the Authority of Intentions, in Law and Interpretation 357 (Andrei Marmor ed., 1995) (grounding formalism in the nature of interpreting legal texts), and Vermeule, supra note 280 (grounding
formalism in consequentialism).
352
See, e.g., Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 461 (2002) (Thomas, J.) (reasoning that allowing legislative purpose to trump enacted text would undermine the Constitution’s legislative process of bicameralism and presentment); Bank One Chi., N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264, 280 (1996) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (objecting to judicial use of legislative history on constitutional
grounds).
353
See Vermeule, supra note 280, at 30–33 (attacking the determinacy of Manning’s arguments); id. at 33 (“But the best reading of the Constitution is that interpretive formalism
and interpretive antiformalism are constitutionally optional for judges.”).
354
See John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 Harv. L.
Rev. 1939, 1944 (2011) (“Viewed in isolation from the constitutionmakers’ many discrete
choices, the concept of separation of powers as such can tell us little, if anything, about
where, how, or to what degree the various powers were, in fact, separated (and blended) in
the Philadelphia Convention’s countless compromises.”); Manning, supra note 104, at 2008
(“But to say, as the Court does in its new federalism cases, that the document adopts an unspecified federalism norm ignores the fact that lawmakers—including constitutionmakers—
must make hard choices about how to carry out their purposes, judgments about what the
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This is not to say constitutional derivations of textualism are inconsistent with formalism; as in statutory interpretation, formalists use arguments from structure and purpose in absence of more determinate indicia. 355 Nor is it to say that these arguments are unpersuasive. It is,
however, to identify these arguments as a kind of constitutional common
law in the lacunae of authoritative text. When we understand interpretive
formalism as an extension of the common law tradition, this should not
be at all surprising. Classical English common lawyers understood constitutional law, including parliamentary supremacy, as common law
rooted in judicial decision, statutes, and custom. When we see how formalist arguments from constitutional structure resemble classical common lawyers’ understanding of unwritten but very real constitutional
norms, we have a better understanding of the character of these arguments and their continuity with past practice.
C. The Common Law Tradition’s Challenge to Nonformalist
Interpretation
An immediate takeaway from the arguments above is that the connection between the common law tradition and nonformalist approaches to
statutory interpretation is not as straightforward as many putatively
“common law” interpreters believe. If the connection between nonformal interpretation is to be more than rhetoric, it must be grounded in
careful argument about the character and direction of a contested tradition. A natural response—challenging this Article’s interpretation of the
tradition—will shift the terms and rhetoric of their debate with formalism. Nonformalists will have to reconcile or justify their departures from
traditional understandings of artificial reason and study more closely the
heritage they claim. Dynamic interpreters, who are more likely to be
found in law schools than on the bench, will have to confront their resemblance to the academic critics of the common law who, drawing on
civil law learning, urged judges to exercise discretion in order to system-

attainment of some purposes is worth in particular settings, and tradeoffs against other values.”).
355
See Manning, supra note 98, at 2434 n.179 (citing Charles L. Black, Jr., Structure and
Relationship in Constitutional Law 3–32 (1969)) (“The structural approach I advance here
parallels the longstanding constitutional tradition of interpreting open-ended grants of power
in light of the constitutional structure as a whole.”).
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ize the muddle of the common law and align it with universal tests of
reason. 356
More concretely, the analysis indicates that some nonformal methods
are more vulnerable than others. First-order moves that depart from formal indicia based on the statute’s content appear more suspect than second-order methods that try to improve the legislative process. For example, an approach that relies on legislative history and selective use of
canons to encourage public-regarding legislation and limit rent-seeking
statutes 357 arguably respects the centrality of common law legislation
more than after-the-fact updating based on the court’s impression of
public values. 358
Nonformal interpreters alternatively may be resigned to the possibility
that the common law tradition at most underwrites a weak purposivism
that attends closely to statutory text and looks to the purpose of a particular statute or provision, rather than the legal fabric as a whole. With the
rise of formalism in the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts, this modest purposivism practiced by Justice Breyer is the least formalist approach to
statutory interpretation one will usually see garnering a Supreme Court
majority. 359 Discriminating use of legislative history, purpose, and appeals to local coherence may lead such an interpreter to override clear
formal indicia in legislation. Nevertheless, this approach, while falling
short of orthodox formalism, lacks the aspirations to systemic doctrinal
elegance of other dynamic approaches and is more likely to take the
sometimes-rugged legal topography as it finds it.
Finally, although this Article’s analysis focuses on federal law, it
should caution jurists (and scholars) who assume that state courts’ undisputed “common law powers” justify greater interpretive dynamism
than in federal courts of limited jurisdiction. 360 To the extent that state
legislatures, too, make statutes in common law fashion, the arguments
356

See Hamburger, supra note 15, at 116–18, 126–41 (contrasting traditional common
lawyers’ more constrained views of the judicial role, legal change, and discretion, with the
ambitions of learned law).
357
See generally, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation
Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 223 (1986);
Cass Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 405 (1989).
358
Whether second-order structural dynamism is significantly more likely to avoid firstorder value judgments is unclear. Cf. Shapiro, supra note 266, at 925 (expressing skepticism
about use of canons for “‘correction’ of legislative imperfections”).
359
See Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 84, 93, 97–98 (2007)
(Breyer, J.); John F. Manning, The New Purposivism, 2011 Sup. Ct. Rev. 113, 113–14.
360
See Kaye, supra note 3, at 1; Pojanowski, supra note 7, at 479–80.
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for faithful agency grounded in the common law tradition would apply.
There may be variance among jurisdictions—Nebraska’s unicameral
legislature comes to mind—but it is possible that the persistence of the
common law tradition in state and federal courts in this respect is not
markedly different. 361 In fact, one of the most notable distinctions between state and federal legislative practice—the likelihood that states
adopt uniform or comprehensive codes—is a state law departure from
the common law tradition. Perhaps it is federal formalists who are today’s “keepers of the common law.” 362
CONCLUSION
The common law, like all living traditions, is a contested one and arguments about its shape and direction obviously do not end with Coke,
Selden, and Hale. Directly to that point, this Article offers a reading of
that tradition’s patterns of thought to argue that formal approaches to
statutory text are both an outgrowth and an adaptation of the common
law tradition in a legal system with far more legislation than Coke, Selden, or Hale ever confronted. If so, advocates of dynamic and strongly
purposive statutory interpretation do not have sole claim on that part of
the American legal heritage. When they invoke the common law tradition, they draw on a complex body of ideas that offers as much challenge to their methods as support. Conversely, interpretive formalists
need not jettison the common law tradition or adopt the reductive,
Hobbesian framework of the tradition’s critics to press their case.
The argument between formalists and their critics, in this light, is a
dispute about which way to develop a tradition, not whether to abandon
it. It takes fewer steps to resolve an argument within a tradition than an
argument in which disputants are talking past each other, or at least mistakenly think they are. Law, after all, handles evolutionary arguments far
easier than revolutionary claims. As this Article hopefully shows, the
common law tradition can provide goals, resources, and standards of
success for resolving the long-running dispute about formality in statutory interpretation.
361

See Nelson, Legitimacy, supra note 77, at 23–24 (noting that “skeptics of federal common law suggest that state courts have more such authority in areas of state law than federal
courts have in areas of federal preemption” and stating that this conclusion is “not obviously
correct”).
362
Cf. Kaye, supra note 3, at 6 (describing her state court as a “keeper[] of the common
law”).

